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ABSTRACT
This study is a comparative analysis o~ the offshore oil
and gas leasing programs of Alabama, Texas, and the Federal
government. It focuses upon the legal and political, rather
than resource, technological, or economic, problems that
have left the Federal program with a record of unmet ex-
pectations and growing frustration.
The long history of turmoil that has embroiled the
Federal leasing program since the 1969 Santa Barbara oil
spill and Arab oil crises is reviewed. The leasing and
regulatory programs of Alabama, Texas, ana the Federal
government are outlined. Alternatives to current Federal
procedures, reflecting State practices, are considered,
including the environmental coding system, and regular,
semi-annual lease sale schedule in Texas, and strict,
zero-discharge environmental regulations, and high royalty
rates and taxes in Alabama.
The common attributes of any offshore oil and gas
leasing program are discussed. Special emphasis is given to
varying methods for distributing exploration and development
rights; each program's ability to capture the economic
returns on rights and resources; and the utilization of
regulatory authority. The legal authority over the sub-
merged lands and resources for each jurisdiction is also
established.
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Finally, five recommendations are made that would serve
to lessen the conflicts that currently frustrate the Federal
offshore leasing and regulatory program.
(1) A resource management code system similar to that
utilized in Texas should be implemented as a framework for
assessing the vast lands under Federal jurisdiction.
(2) Further consideration should be given to stricter
offshore environmental regulation by the Federal government
as a means for minimizing environmental impacts.
(3) The Federal government should increase royalty rates
on offshore production significantly, allowing for increased
returns on public resources and less pressure to maintain
high leasing rates.
(4) Competition for Federal offshore leases should be
increased to better assure high returns on public resources.
(5) The Federal lease sale preparation process should be
adjusted to allow for industry input as to specific areas of
interest at a point closer to the actual sale date, allowing
more operators to participate in the process.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Hidden below our coastal waters, this nation's con-
tinental shelf holds resources of inestimable wealth. Wide
variations in the reports and speculations of "experts"
clarify how little is actually known of these buried
riches. Oil and gas resources, though only a small part of
the potential, are of the greatest immediate value and have
been the focus of offshore activity and controversy in
recent years.
The United States (U.S.) government, trustee of the
outer continental shelf (OCS--those submerged continental
lands beyond the seaward limits of State jurisdiction), has
leased approximately thirty-seven million acres for oil and
gas development since 1953; on these tracts some twenty-two
thousand wells have been drilled, yielding more than six
billion barrels of oil and sixty-two trillion cubic feet of
natural gas.!/ Much exploration and development has taken
place, however the potential is still debated. Industry
estimates that the oes may contain sixty percent of the
nation's undiscovered oil and gas resources; the Minerals
Management Service (MMS), in contrast, indicates that 21 to
41 percent of all domestic undiscovered oil and 25 to 30
percent of undiscovered natural gas resources are held
within our Federal maritime jurisdiction.~/ Further
1
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research is necessary to determine the most basic facts; as
stated by former Secretary of the Interior James Watt: "We
may have • • • only scratched the surface of the vast energy
potential that lies beneath the waters of our outer conti-
nental shelf."~/
Currently, the worldwide oversupply of hydrocarbons has
granted a reprieve from rapidly increasing prices and
limited availability of oil and gas resources, but this is
only an aberration in a most dangerous long-term trend.
Energy problems facing the United States remain critical a
decade after the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
try's (OPEC) first grave warning:
o In the past thirty years, the U.S. has gone from
importing seven percent of domestic oil needs to
importing fifty percent.
In 1978, imports were greatly responsible for a
$33.8 billion balance of trade deficit and the
imbalance has only grown since.
Since 1970 domestic oil production has declined
steadily; from 1970-80 OCS oil production decreased
thirty-four percent.!/
In 1984 total domestic energy demand rose seven
percent over 1983, while recent reports agree that
domestic oil and gas production will continue to
decline at least through the year 2000.~/
Figures such as these put into question America's future
2
as a strong, independent military and economic world
leader. Facts make apparent our inability to deal effec-
tively with this looming disaster. Since President Nixon
inaugurated "Project Independence" in response to the
original OPEC action, every President has called upon the
nation to conserve and offered a new plan for increased
domestic production. The national goal over the past decade
has been, as President Carter promised," • energy
security in the years ahead."~/ Yet a 1979 Central Intel-
ligence Agency assessment warns of oil imports supplying
nearly seventy-five percent of domestic consumption by 1990,
and little since 1979 would seem to put this estimate into
question.lI Significant declines in domestic production are
expected in the next few years as production at the Prudhoe
Bay field, which currently supplies nearly twenty percent of
the nation's domestic oil, peaks and initially begins to
decrease by approximately fifteen percent per year.~/
The oil and gas of the DeS represents the "last major
frontier" for domestic production of this vital energy
resource and has been at the center of each Administration's
plans for increased domestic development. As of January
1984, less than two percent of the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) off Alaska and the continental U.S. had been leased
for energy exploitation however, and production on the OCS,
though supplying nine percent of our domestic oil, has
declined by more than a third since the 1978 Arab oil
3
crisis.~/
There are grave discontinuities between recent policies
and facts. In trying to assess the ongoing problems in the
program, the conflicts between Federal agencies, laws whose
purposes are opposed, legal and political battles between
Federal and State governments, and the interests of environ-
mentalists, industry, and the American public all must be
considered. The introduction of this study reviews some of
the history of these problems, which plagued us in the 1970s
and remain with us in the 1980s; begins to quantify at least
a part of their great cost to the nation; and goes on to
outline the programs that will be analyzed in the remainder
of the study as alternatives to the Federal government's
leasing and regulatory programs.
Development and History
Prior to the turn of this century, anyone who could
extract minerals was encouraged to freely stake and mine
claims on Federal lands. Resources were thought to be
inexhaustible and the government was a catalyst in efforts
to harness the "unlimited wealth."lQ/ Franklin Roosevelt
was the first President to consider regulating the con-
tinental shelf, specifically he wished to ensure "••
Federal jurisdiction ••• as far out into the ocean as it
is mechanically possible to drill wells."ll/
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In 1934, the Department of the Interior (DOl) rejected a
series of requests for leases off the coast of California,
believing that these lands were outside Federal control. In
May of 1945, however, the Department filed suit against the
Pacific Western Oil Company to enjoin the firm from extract-
ing oil of the continental shelf under State license. In
September of that year, President Truman went on to proclaim
the exclusive rights of the United States to the natural
resources of the subsoil and seabed of all the continental
shelf.~1
In 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
Federal government in the Pacific Western Oil case, recog-
nizing its paramount rights to n ••• full dominion and
power over the lands, minerals, and other things underlying
the Pacific Ocean seaward of the ordinary low water mark •
. fllli Subsequent rulings clarified Federal jurisdiction
over all the continental shelf off the nation's coast. It
is appropriate that U.S. control over offshore resources was
first established in a courtroom, for legal battles have
been an unending and most significant facet of the Federal
tenure over the continental shelf.
The 1947 Supreme Court decision moved the battle for
offshore dominion to the political arena and focused
attention on the "Tidelands Controversy." States sought
Congressional action to return their jurisdiction. On two
occasions, President Truman vetoed such bills, believing
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there was n ••• no good reason for the Federal government
to make an outright gift for the benefit of a few coastal
States of property interests worth billions of dollars."!!/
The second point in the debate turned on the signifi-
cance of petroleum to the national security and well being.
The U.S. had recently become a net importer of oil and the
government, with industry, was just beginning its efforts to
fully develop OCS resources, an effort that continues
today.~/
With the election in 1952 of Dwight Eisenhower as
President, temporary compromises were enacted. The
Submerged Lands Act of 1953 gave coastal States title to
submerged lands seaward to three miles off the coast--the
limit of the U.S. territorial sea. Three months later,
Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA) which provided statutory authority" .•• for the
granting of leases in the outer shelf area and gave power to
the Secretary of the Interior to administer the leasing and
to prescribe such rules and regulations as were neces-
sary."16/
Through 1969, OCS leasing proceeded slowly, with
approximately one sale per year. Most lands nominated by
industry were offered in sales. The program was limited to
the Gulf of Mexico and a few tracts in Southern California;
Interior's policy was one of pacing developing at a rela-
tively slow rate to keep demand for leases strong, thus
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keeping bonus bids high. With the relatively easy avail-
ability of onshore oil and gas and foreign imports, there
was little academic, public, or political scrutiny of OCS
activities or their value.1l1
On the night of January 27, 1969, when Union Oil's Plat-
form A in the Santa Barbara Channel "blew out," a series of
events were triggered that would markedly change the U.S.
OCS leasing program and throw it into the turmoil where it
remains today. Writes Henry Lee, "No single incident of
environmental degradation had had as profound an impact on
the American conscience, ••• millions of people became
firsthand witnesses to the effects of this major spill
through the medium of television."181
The 1970 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) marked
part of Congress' reaction to rising environmental concern
in the nation. At the center of NEPA is the requirement for
an environmental impact statement (EIS) prior to the initia-
tion of action on any program " • •• significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment."~1 Each EIS must
contain detailed discussions of such factors as the environ-
mental impact of, the reasonable alternatives to, and the
economic costs and benefits of the proposed action. Legal
controversy over what specifically constitutes a thorough
EIS continues and has been used extensively as a weapon by
States and environmentalists to hinder development of the
OCS.
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In 1971, President Nixon, concerned over rapidly in-
creasing national dependence on oil imports, ordered Dor to
increase OCS leasing and publish a comprehensive five-year
lease sale schedule. In April of 1973, Nixon again called
for increases; from one million acres of leasing in 1973 to
three million in 1974.~/ Environmental litigation stalled
these early Nixon initiatives.
The OPEC oil embargo of October 1973 brought public
pressure for increased domestic energy production to bear
upon the OCS program. The President instructed Dor to
accelerate OCS leasing to ten million acres a year by 1975.
At this time, numerous Congressional committees also under-
took investigations.
Through the late 1960s and early 1970s, several intense
and conflicting pressures came to bear upon State and
Federal policy makers. Congress, in the 1970s developed two
bills to deal with these rising pressures; however, it soon
became apparent that policy directives within the two Acts
were, to a great extent, mutually exclusive.
The OCSLA was amended extensively in 1978 after years of
Congressional debate. In brief, the amendment's goals were
to modernize the administrative policies and provisions of
the Federal OCS leasing program to (1) make offshore oil and
gas resources available to meet the Nation's energy needs as
rapidly as possible; (2) balance orderly energy resource
development with protection of the human, marine, and
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coastal environments; (3) ensure the public a fair and
equitable return on OCS resources; (4) coordinate consul-
tations between the Department of Interior and the governors
of affected coastal States; and (5) preserve and maintain
free enterprise competition.l!/
The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) of 1972 was
drafted to "••• protect and give high priority to the
natural systems of the coastal zone."~/ In the Act,
Congress encouraged States "••. to exercise their full
authority over the lands and waters in the coastal zone" and
directed that Federal activities be consistent, to "•••
the greatest degree possible," with State plans.Q/ The
Stratton Commission in 1969 had reported on the emergence of
Federal-State conflicts with respect to marine and estuarine
resources; CZMA was a Congressional effort to diffuse the
growing political polarization.~/
In 1984 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the case,
Secretary of the Interior v. California (104 S. Ct. 656
(1984», that only Federal activities subsequent to OCS
lease sales were subject to the consistency requirements of
CZMA. California had argued that OCS lease sales under the
CZMA must be consistent with the State's coastal zone plan,
as sales were an essential step in determining where oil and
gas activity would take place. The Supreme Court ruled,
however, that lease sales did not directly impact the
coastal zone (as exploration and development activities do),
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so Federal pre-lease and lease activities could not be
tested under the consistency requirement. This ruling was
seen by many as contradicting Congressional intent under
CZMA and a threat to States' rights offshore; it has since
become a political issue and subject for much Congressional
debate. To date, there has been no resolution of the
issue.~/
Several other environmental laws enacted in the 1970s
are applicable to the offshore leasing and development pro-
cess, but to a much lesser extent, examples include: the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972,
the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, the Endangered
Species Act of 1973, the Clean Water Act of 1970, and the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972.
Conflict and Litigation
The purposes and goals of this varying legislation from
the 1970s, correct and worthwhile as each may be, set up a
situation where real and direct conflicts exist between
Federal laws and policy. In fact, within the OCS Lands Act
Amendments (OCSLAA) themselves, there are intrinsically
opposed goals that reflect an ongoing national dialetic.
The people of the United States have developed a strong
environmental consciousness, as a result of the continuing
acts of degradation wrought by our advanced society. The
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oceans, and especially the coastal waters with which the
majority of Americans have contact, are "sacred" in our
minds; often subconsciously, the oceans are an enduring
symbol for our hopes and dreams of a more pristine, simple
life. Efforts to place drilling platforms off our beaches
and the ensuing risks of perceived disaster are often viewed
as running directly counter to the people's environmentalist
thinking, which in recent years has been increasingly
recognized as a steady and powerful force in this nation's
political process.
Americans also cherish an indulgent life-style, which is
taken to an extent unique in the world. Our daily routines
are dependent upon an ever increasing supply of oil. The
tremendous risks encountered through becoming so dependent
upon foreign oil supplies are obvious, but even the gravest
of warnings cannot shake the masses from their continued
indulgence. National leaders have attempted to guarantee at
least a measure of security by developing domestic supplies
to the fullest; the OCS, where the majority of our undis-
covered resources are believed to be buried, has naturally
been a focus of these efforts.
The two worthy goals of increasing domestic production
of hydrocarbons and protecting our coveted coastal environ-
ment are often in opposition. Other conflicts further
confuse the debate, but this inevitable confrontation of
national policies is the fulcrum of conflict.
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The ongoing dialetic between national goals has proven
very costly to this country. The OCS leasing and regulatory
program has been in a constant state of flux since 1969, as
the Federal officials, offshore operators, environmen-
talists, politicians, and other interest groups have sought
to shape the development process out of various pieces of
legislation that speak to all their interests. The result
has been development of what many, both in and outside the
government, believe is an excessively lengthy, expensive,
and complicated leasing and regulatory system, that to this
day remains mercurial. Continuing problems have had their
own effect in shaping offshore development; an example of
this would be the fact that industry has turned away from
exploration work in frontier areas such as the North Atlan-
tic and regions offshore Alaska where opposition to activity
is strong. The effects have been predictable as the General
Accounting Office concluded in a 1981 study: "The policies
of government and the predictability of lease sales is a
critical factor in determining industry interest in OCS
activities."~/
Litigation has played a central part in the development
of a Federal leasing program for continental shelf oil and
gas. Louisiana, subsequent to the Pacific Western Oil
Company rUling establishing Federal domain, has been before
the Supreme Court no less than ten times in attempts to
establish its seaward boundary. In 1975 Atlantic coastal
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States again took the battle over Federal/State offshore
sovereignty to the Supreme Court, where previous rulings
were upheld. To date, no coastal State has officially
charted its three mile sea and suits to establish boundaries
continue.~/
By far the greatest number of lawsuits, however, have
concerned technical requirements and regulation of the OCS
as it is handled by 001 under Congressional mandate. Many
cases have been brought by environmental groups, endeavoring
to assert the strictest possible rules over whatever oil and
gas activity eventually takes place. States have been
active in pursuing delaying actions, as a means of streng-
thening their consultative role in OCS decisions, pressuring
the Federal government to initiate OCS revenue sharing, and
ensuring stringent environmental regulation. With the
exceptions of Texas and Louisiana, States have not taken a
"partnership" role in supporting the Federal government's
development of the OCS, and even Texas and Louisiana in 1984
brought suits to halt Gulf of Mexico OCS sales. Congress,
in drafting the CZMA of .1972 and OCS Lands Act Amendments of
1978, attempted, but failed, to forge a harmonious relation-
ship.
J. Robinson West, former Assistant Secretary of the
Interior for Policy, BUdget, and Administration, in a
hearing before the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee stated: "The benefits of the OCS oil and gas
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program are spread across the nation, while the social and
environmental risks are disproportionately concentrated
locally."~/ West's simple statement makes clear the reason
for much of the States' opposition to OCS activity.
Challenges to the adequacy of environmental impact
statements (EIS) considering the OCS have been brought in
thirteen suits since NEPA's inception in 1970. Legal
precedents continue to be set and requirements clarified;
but efforts to restructure the leasing program regularly
reopen the process to entirely new rounds of suits.
Section 18 of the OCSLAA sets a step-by-step procedural
process which must be followed in developing five-year
leasing schedules, as well as a list of factors and con-
siderations which must be examined in drafting the plans.
Charges of DOl mishandling of these legislative directives
have been brought in nine cases so far; preparation of a
third five-year OCS leasing program to take effect in late
1986 will again provide grounds for future suits concerning
the inadequacy of DOl administration of the OCSLAA.
The "consistency requirements" embodied in the CZMA have
served as the basis for additional challenges to DOl actions
in four cases. Further charges have also been brought in
suits based upon the Administrative Procedures Act, the
Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act,
and other Federal statutes.29/
14
oCosts and Revenues
Between 1981 and July 1985, fifteen of the twenty-four
OCS lease sales held nationally have been litigated.~/ The
Dar believes that, to a great extent, the political and
legal opposition which these suits represent has been
responsible for the thirty-four percent decrease in oil
production over the past decade. This conclusion came out
as part of a 1982 analysis by the OCS Revenue Sharing
Working Group of the President's Cabinet Council on Natural
Resources and Environment on " ••• the costs to the nation
from delays in leasing, deletion of tracts from sales, legal
costs, and other expenses incurred as a result of opposition
from some of the coastal States."l!/ The study estimated
the costs of opposition at $1.122 billion between 1978 and
1981; this is a conservative figure for there were many
costs which the Working Group could not quantify and did not
take into account. The analysis did not consider
o the effect of the "discounts" industry would
logically subtract from bids on controversial
tracts where litigation could be expected;
the costs of early deletions of tracts to meet
State demands prior to issuance of the proposed
notice of sale;
o the costs of implementing various stipulations or
studies; or
15
o a number of other possibilities.
In conclusion, the Working Group attempted to estimate
future costs, figuring on the acceleration of lease sales
and continued State opposition to Federal efforts; it
projected annual losses at over $1 billion. In reviewing
the Group's findings the actual numbers arrived at are of
little importance, as it would be almost impossible to
derive "accurate and proven" costs; it is important to
realize, however, that States' opposition to the oes program
does result in significant losses to the Nation.
The oes oil and gas leasing program is now the largest
producer of revenue for the Federal treasury after taxes and
according to the Office of Management and Budget,". • an
important component of President Reagan's economic recovery
program."32/ While the oes program has grown to be an
important source of income for the Federal government, its
earnings have been erratic. This, to a great extent, is due
to the fact that bonus bid revenues make up the greatest
portion of total income from the program.
The Federal offshore leasing program first produced
annual revenues over $1 billion in 1968, the following year
the income was less than one-quarter of 1968 earnings. The
income record has been erratic throughout recent decades;
annual revenues for the period are set out on Table 1. In
1974 the program brought in more than $5.5 billion, in 1975
$1.7 billion. Earnings since 1979 have been relatively
16
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./9,111 ,641 2,509,1 42,300 25,342,067,635 5,11,.4.0>6,04 33,400,638,163 76
-...J 1978 1,161,042.064 2,201,183 21,512,669 3,950 1,139,198,244 11,1 41,838 2,941,111,948 28,283,119,583 1,096,500,055 40,497,138,318 701979 5,018,061,691 2,Db8,118 20.281,300 6,632 1,512,017,664 3,330,286 6,616,591,052 34,899,171,635 9,273,17R,309 49,170,116,~1I II1980 4,101,610,151 1,291,133 19,062,498 .- 2,132,518.739 4,'134,686 6,362,651,613 41,261,119,1~O 13,055,515,83Z 61,R1S.931,~59 ~61981 (t)6,6'I,899,1~2 70250,300 21 ,131,035 .. 3,281,219,402 1,210,822 9,911,430,121 51,186,859,969 10,199.023,101 83,015,755,660 611982 3,9Rl,I90,009 2,393,159 20,061,651 .. 3,814,811 ,635
.. 7,M3,204,501 59,011,611,023 22,573,099,138 105,598,854,198 561983 W~,016,369 4,163,658 31,267.318 _. 3,375.688.165
.. 9,159.812,990 68,113,112.563
.....?I....,.Qll.5.!..l,lQl 126,632.366,005 54
Tolals $41,091,116,403 143,145,861 P34,141,273 $1,423,258 110,524,321.114 S1 11.301,594 168,173,112,563 168.113,112,563 1126,632,366,005 1126,632,366,005 51
(a) Condenute roy.1tles Included.
(b) Olher rcyrnues tol.l (111,301,594 from the fOllowing sources: Sulfur rOyllties, 145,246,6111
S.lt roy.ltles, 1129,546; GasolIne .nd LPG roy.ltles, S1l6.689,678; Gil Lost, 115,099,115,
.nd all Loll, 1135,980. (See page 17 for indlyidu.l years and totals.)
lcl Production yalue Is value II time of prOduction, not current Yalue.
d Percentage reflects Iota 1 cu..,latlve revenue dlylded by total cumulative production value.
This percentage represcnts the Fodoral GoYernment'S.share of the revonue genorated from the
competitIve leasing and prlYate deyelopment of rederal 011 .nd 9aS resources.
(e) Bonus fl9ure for 1981 Is adjusted to Include 5 tracts for whIch luses were not Issued until
1984 bec.use or litigation. eonus paId for the 5 tracts: 110,846,000.
Nole: [scrow fundI dIstributed to the State of Louisiana and lessees, pursuant to Supreme Cour1.
decrees, are not deducted from total revenues.
Table 1. Revenue and Production Value, Federal OCS 1953-1983.
(U.S., Department of the Interior, Minerals Management
Service, Federal Offshore Statistics, pp.50-51.).
high, in 1981 income reached its record at just under $10
billion. In 1983, revenues totalled $9.160 billion, of
which nearly $5.7 billion was from bonus bids, $3.4 billion
was from royalties, and $37 million from rentals and minimum
royalty payments.ill Given the significance of bonus bid
revenues in keeping total government earnings high, in this
period of tight and highly controversial Federal budgets it
is easy to conclude that pressures exist to keep leasing
rates, and thus revenues, growing.
Commencement
There are a myriad of problems with the Federal DCS oil
and gas program; while resources continue to be leased and
developed, virtually no interested party would argue that
the process takes place in a most efficient or rational
way. Greater development of domestic energy resources,
especially those of the DCS, is a most important national
priority and as long as the OCS leasing and regulatory
program remains in turmoil, the costs will only increase.
There is also little hope for the situation to improve
without significant action by Congress or the Executive
branch, for previously enacted pieces of legislation provide
all parties the legal bases from which to pursue their own
interests in shaping the mercurial process.
Given the great number of problems with u.s. governance
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over OCS resources, the even greater number concerned par-
ties and interests trying to restructure the program for
their own benefit, and the inestimable number of outside
factors that control levels of activity on the OCS, efforts
at reform are difficult. At the center of this nexus of
problems, interests, and uncontrollable factors is the
leasing and development program designed and managed by the
Federal government. It is the framework into which all
these factors fit, whether they are controllable by Federal
actions or not. With its importance, it is ironic that, as
Henry Lee writes in analyzing OCS resource development
issues:
The technical and scientific aspects have received
considerable attention, while institutional and
procedural parameters have often been ignored. Yet
it is clear that the decision-making process--this
complex system of inputs and personalities--may be
a more significant influence on the final decision
than all the data and information put together.}!/
This study is an attempt to assess the Federal OCS
leasing and regulatory program through a comparative
analysis process utilizing two coastal State management
programs. The policies and approaches employed by U.S.
coastal States offshore in many cases offer tested alter-
natives to Federal programs. The often conflicting or even
mutually exclusive goals of the OCS management program are
common to many other governments' programs--promoting
offshore development to meet economic needs, allowing
development while ensuring environmental protection,
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receiving a fair and equitable return on public resources,
and preserving competition. As these goals are so difficult
to balance and bring into harmony, knowledge and assessment
of the experiences others have had may lead to better
governance; such comparisons have for too long been over-
looked by struggling Federal resource managers.
The offshore management programs of Alabama and Texas
have been chosen for consideration in this study, however a
number of other State or foreign nations' programs also
could have provided valuable comparisons. Alabama has a
relatively new leasing and development program, which has
only been the subject of significant interest and concern
within the State since the 1979 discovery of commercially
producible natural gas resources under Mobile Bay. Envi-
ronmental restrictions have been stringent for work in State
waters; all leases have included a zero discharge stipula-
tion for rigs and platforms operating offshore. Royalties
have ranged as high as twenty-eight percent, in addition to
ten percent severance taxes and bonus bid requirements. In
September 1984, Mobil Oil announced plans to initiate the
first production of natural gas in State waters. Alabama
was chosen to be a part of this study as an example of a
program recently developed and going through many changes,
while maintaining priority interest in State revenues and
environmental protection.
Texas has a long and active history of development
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within its coastal waters. The State's leasing system is
well organized, smoothly run, and a source of significant
revenue. Sales are held twice a year for lands nominated by
industry and the Notice for Bids published prior to each
sale includes codes describing all environmental concerns or
stipulations for each specific tract offered, based upon
input from all interested State and Federal agencies. After
a general review of coastal States' programs, the Texas
system was chosen for consideration in this study because of
its effectiveness and efficiency.
The choice of two States with coasts on the Gulf of
Mexico, where the overwhelming portion of oes activity also
takes place, sets up a study where many of the regional
environmental and technological factors, as well as the
public's perception of the oil and gas industry, are rela-
tively constant. This allows for a better comparison of
differing leasing and regulatory measures.
The first chapter of this study has briefly set out the
importance of and continuing problems with the Federal
government's oes development program. The following two
chapters will generally consider the conduct of the Alabama
and Texas offshore management programs (respectively). The
fourth chapter will outline the present status and proce-
dures of the Federal leasing and regulatory program. This
study's final chapter will compare varying facets of the
three programs studied, assess the possible utility of
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alternative leasing and regulatory measures to the Federal
government in better meeting the goals of the OCSLAA, and
conclude with a series of recommendations for action.
All offshore oil and gas leasing programs have certain
common attributes: (1) clearly defined legal authority over
lands or a given resource; (2) methods for distributing
exploration and development rights; (3) an ability to gain
return on rights and/or resources; and (4) regulatory
authority over activities affecting the lands, resource,
and/or surrounding lands and resources. As the Federal and
State programs considered in this study are outlined, each
facet will fall into one of these categories. While any
number of comparative points between these programs could be
discussed, only a few have been focused upon in the conclu-
sion and they are the basis of the recommendations made.
The discussions of the Alabama, Texas, and Federal pro-
grams are opened with brief, straightforward histories of
the legal and political actions that settled these govern-
ments' varying jurisdictions offshore. Thus, their
authority over the submerged lands and resources to be
discussed is established. Three areas are reviewed in the
study's concluding chapter. As an alternative method for
distributing exploration and development rights, changes in
the Federal lease sale scheduling process are considered
that could lead to increased development and competitive-
ness. Alternatives to the Federal government's reliance on
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bonus bids are discussed as they affect the government's
ability to gain returns on rights or resources. A system
that increases reliance on royalty revenues relative to
bonus bids is considered as it would ease certain indirect,
but strong, pressures on Federal authorities to maintain
high leasing rates. And a new approach to environmental
regulation is studied as one facet of the authority that may
be exercised over activities affecting the lands, resource,
and/or surrounding lands and resources under the Federal
jurisdiction. A coding system for offshore lease tracts
that would benefit government regulators, the public, and
the oil and gas industry is considered, as is the impact of
more restrictive environmental regulation on development.
While it is understood that the programs analyzed are
very different in terms of the underlying resources, the
history and scope of the systems, and many other factors,
when allowances are made there is a great deal to be
learned, if from nothing else, others' mistakes.
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CHAPTER II
THE ALABAMA PROGRAM
For more than a century, the oil and gas industry has
been active in the State of Alabama. In 1865 the first
exploratory wells were spudded in Lawrence County, Alabama;
it was not until 1944, however, that the first discovery
took place in the State. The 1970s brought substantial
increases in onshore oil and gas activity and for the first
time made Alabama an important oil and gas producing State
nationally (see Figure 1). In 1970, Alabama ranked 21st in
the nation in the production of oil and condensate, and 26th
in the production of natural gas. By 1983, the State ranked
17th in production of liquid hydrocarbons and 16th in pro-
duction of gas.!/
While the State has a long history of onshore develop-
ment, and significant increases in industry activity and
State revenue during the 1970s brought little notice or
controversy, the same cannot be said for offshore operations
in State waters (see Figure 2).
State Jurisdiction
The State of Alabama's jurisdiction over coastal waters
off its shores was defined by two U.S. Supreme Court
rulings. On September 26, 1953, the State of Alabama filed
27
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1983, p.?).
suit in the Supreme Court to test the constitutionality of
the Submerged Lands Act (Public Law 83-31), which had been
signed into law on May 22, 1953. Alabama and its codefen-
dants raised two objections to Public Law 83-31: (1) it was
claimed Congress could not dispose of public lands because
submerged lands and natural resources were held in trust for
all the States rather than the select coastal States; and
(2) it was held that the Act violated the equal-footing
clause which guarantees equal rights to all States upon
admission to the Union (Alabama v. Texas, Louisiana,
Florida, California, and the Secretaries of the Treasury,
Navy, and Interior, and the Treasurer of the U.S. (347 U.S.
272-273 (1954)). On March 15, 1954, the Court denied the
motions of Alabama and Rhode Island, which had filed a
second, similar case, ruling in a brief, per curiam, opinion
that Congress had the power to dispose of any kind of pro-
perty belonging to the United States without limitation.~/
The second Supreme Court decision leading to settlement
of Alabama's offshore jurisdiction came in the May 31, 1960
ruling in the case of United States v. Louisiana, Texas,
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida (363 U.S. 1, 121 (1960)).
Alabama claimed that when the State entered the Union in
1812, its boundaries were defined as extending offshore six
marine leagues and that the act enabling its entrance to the
Union recognized such a boundary (one marine league equals
approximately 3.45 statute miles). The boundary description
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literally read "including all islands within six marine
leagues of the shore" and the Court ruled that such wording
established claim only to the islands and thus did not in-
clude the waters or submerged lands within that distance.l/
On similar grounds, the boundaries of Louisiana and Missis-
sippi were also ruled to extend only three geographic miles
offshore, as legislated in the Submerged Lands Act.
While Public Law 83-31 set the extent of jurisdiction
offshore, no coastal State has ever legally defined its
coastal baseline or mapped its seaward boundary. Thus
governance of submerged territory offshore takes place under
customary agreements between the concerned coastal State and
the Federal government.!/
Early Offshore Exploration
While the State's offshore jurisdiction is not yet
officially settled, in the 1950s oil and gas activities in
coastal waters were initiated. The State divided the waters
off its shore into four sectors--A, B, C, and 0, and in 1951
allowed Gulf Oil to drill two exploratory wells. The first
well, completed on December 5, 1951, reached a total depth
of 10,027 feet. The second Gulf well, plugged and abandoned
on January 31, 1952, reached a depth of 11,020 feet. Nei-
ther well reported shows of oil or gas resources.~/
Following completion of Gulf's second well in January
31
1952, no drilling took place in Alabama coastal waters until
November 1978, though Mobil Oil Exploration and Producing
Southeast, Inc. (MOEPSI) sought permits for exploratory work
between 1969 and 1978.6/ While oil and gas development
onshore in Alabama proceeded during the 1970s, environmental
concern (as exp~essed through litigation) halted efforts to
move ahead with any offsho~e drilling for nearly a decade.
Mobile Bay, inside the coastal barrier islands, is for the
most part only between six and twelve feet deep. Enviran-
mental and coastal interests voiced fears that oil and gas
activity in such a sensitive area would degrade the Bay and
threaten the State's seafood and tourist industries.7/ The
"zero discharge" regulations, under which offshore operators
in Alabama's waters work today, make clear the State's
commitment to" • seeing that offshore oil and gas ex-
ploration and exploitation do not negatively impact the
quality of a State's coastal areas and adjacent waters.
Alabama's approach in this rega~d seems carefully con-
sidered."~/
While no drilling took place in Alabama coastal waters
between 1952 and 1978, large areas of the State's submerged
lands were leased in numerous sales between 1951 and 1969.
During this period there was no clearly defined leasing
program as would be recognized today. Many of the leases
were awarded for as little as two cents per acre and only
eight leases brought more than $20,000 in bonus bids. The
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highest of these bids totaled only $39,408. Lands were
leased many times, however: Tract 94, which is now part of
the productive Lower Mobile Bay-Mary Ann Field, was leased
four times between 1956 and 1969 (see Figure 3).21
The most significant of these early offshore lease sales
occurred in October 1969. In that sale, MOEPSI leased
Tracts 76, 77, 94, and 95 located near the mouth of Mobile
Bay. The four leases were awarded for a total bonus of
$78,822, with 16.67 percent royalty rates, annual rental
payments of $1 per acre, and five-year lease terms.1:..Q/
Following award of these leases, MOEPSI began the nearly
decade-long legal battle to obtain the permits necessary for
spudding an exploratory well.
On November 17, 1978, MOEPSI initiated drilling on Tract
75 and a year later announced discovery of a significant
natural gas reserve. Delineation drilling has since led to
reserve estimates for the Lower Mobile Bay-Mary Ann Field as
high as 600 billion cubic feet of gas.ll/ Subsequent dis-
coveries have led analysts to predict that the Mobile Bay
area's Norphlet formation may be one of the five largest
natural gas reserves in the nation.~/
Since Mobil Oil's discovery of significant natural gas
reserves in the Mobile Bay area, every exploratory well
drilled below 20,000 feet into the Norphlet formation has
shown productive flows of gas. As of December 31, 1984, ten
wells had been drilled in Alabama waters subsequent to
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Figu~e 3. Offsho~e Oil and Gas Activity in the Mobile Bay A~ea.
(State oil and Gas Boa~d, oil and Gas Leasing, p.3.).
Mobil's discovery well.lll More information on these wells
is presented on Table 2. Offshore operat0rs, especially
Exxon and Mobil, have been anxious to spud more wells in the
area, but have been restricted by the time consuming nature
of the regulatory process.!!1 Numerous wells drilled in the
Mobile and Pensacola Federal OCS leasing areas adjacent to
Alabama State waters have also proven productive and ex-
tended the known parameters of the ~orphlet formation.~1
Prior to the 1979 Mobil Oil discovery in Alabama waters,
only one exploratory well had been drilled in either the
Mobile or Pensacola Federal OCS leasing areas. More than a
dozen OCS wells were spudded between the 1979 discovery and
the close of 1984; much of this activity is a direct result
of the success of wells drilled in Mobile Bay.
In September 1984, Mobil Oil announced its plans to
initiate the first development project in Alabama waters.
Plans call for the placement of four production platforms in
the Lower Mobile Bay-Mary Ann Field area at a cost of $400
million. Production will be transported by pipeline to an
onshore gas processing plant built to handle up to eighty
million cubic feet of natural gas per day. The Mobil Oil's
original plans called for production initiating in late
1986.~1 Given the number and size of natural gas dis-
coveries made in the Mobile Bay area's Norphlet formation,
this development project offshore Alabama is expected to be
only the first of many.
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Suspension
State State of Total
block lease Well Permit drilling depth
no. no_ na. no. Operator operations (MO') Status
37 0 1 310 Gulf 12/05/51 10,027 PA2
18 D 2 313 Gulf 01/31/52 11,020 PA
76 347 1 2543-0S-38 MOEPSI 12/28/79 21,113 Gas-SI·
94 349 2 3135-0S-68 MOEPSI 06/01/82 21,859 Gas-SI
95 350 1 3127-0S-5 MOEPSI 09/15/82 20,949 Gas-SI
95 350 2 3346-0S-88 MOEPSJ 10/13/82 3,058 Gas-SI
77 348 1 3548-0S-11 MOEPSI 04/08/83 20,984 Gas-SI
76 347 2 3614-0S-14 MOEPSI 08/01/83 20,981 TA5
62 534 1 3632-0S-15 Exxon 09/06/83 20,822 TA
72 528 1 3802-0S-18 MOEPSI 03/05/84 21,315 Gas-SI
63 535 1 4068-0S-21 Exxon 09/11/84 21,000 Gas-SI
77 348 2 3840-0S-198 MOEPSI 09/25/84 21,710 TA
112 537 1 4131-0S-22 Exxon 02/10/85 21,965 Gas-SI
115 538 1 4266-0S-23 Exxon NAJ NA Drilling
114 624 1 4436-0S-24 Exxon NA NA Drilling
1 MD - measured depth in feet. JNA - not available.
7PA - plugged and abandoned. ·Sl - shut in.
5TA - temporarily abandoned.
Table 2. Wells Drilled in Alabama State Waters.
(State Oil and Gas Board, Oil .and Gas Leasing, p.34.).
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vat ion and Natural Resources with the approval of the
Governor. The authority for this le3sing activity is found
in S~ction 9-17-62 of the 1975 Alabama State Code, which
reads as follows:
The commissioner of conservation and natural
resources, on behalf of the state, is hereby autho-
rized to lease, upon such terms as he may approve,
any lands or any rights or any interest therein
under any navigable streams or navigable waters,
bays, estuaries, lagoons, bayous or lakes and the
shores along any navigable waters to the high tide
mark and submerged lands in the Gulf of Mexico
within the historic seaward boundary of this state,
which is hereby declared to extend seaward six
leagues from the land bordering the gulf, for the
exploration, development and production of oil, gas
and other minerals or anyone or more of them, on,
in and under such lands, and such lands or inter-
ests therein for such purposes shall be supervised
and managed by the department of conservation and
natural resources.
The Commissioner of the Department of Conservation and
Natural Resources is appointed by the Governor and has sole
authority for leasing. Within the Department, the Division
of State Lands handles the leasing program.~/
Under Section 9-17-65 of the 1975 State Code, the Com-
missioner is to lease all lands by sealed competitive bids.
Invitations to bid must be published in The Montgomery
Advertiser at least twenty-five days before the final date
for submitting bids and the bids are to be opened publicly
in the office of the Commissioner on the date specified in
the invitation.
Within Section 9-17-65 are the vague directives that
establish the goals of the State's leasing program.
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In the
passage of the section that follows are the essential guide-
lines--that the bidder be "responsible," that the "public
interest" be served by award of the lease, and that the
lease be awarded on the basis of the "most advantageous
offer" to the State.
The lease of any tract of land shall be
awarded to the highest responsible bidder making
the most advantageous offer to the state, and the
commissioner of conservation and natural resources
must either accept the most advantageous offer or
reject all bids within five days from the date said
bids were opened. The commissioner of conservation
and natural resources may reject all bids on any
tract of land when, in his opinion, the public
interest will be served thereby, but such tract of
land shall not thereafter be leased except in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this division.!1/
Given the limited number of submerged blocks in State
waters, the Commissioner has established no schedule for
lease sales offshore.~/ It is the desire of the State to
ensure that enough advance notice of sales is provided to
allow potential bidders adequate time to assess tracts and
develop bidding strategies. For the August 1984 offering,
the first announcement, a Call for Nominations, was issued
in September 1983--nearly a full year prior to the sale (see
Appendix l).~/
While the Commissioner may have preferred methods for
the conduct of a lease sale, the fact that there have been
only three sales in recent times means that no set, estab-
lished practices are recognized. With growing industry
interest in the Norphlet gas formation underlying State
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waters and the large sums of money involved, the conduct of
lease sales has come under significant political influence
in the absence of set practices.
The offshore offering in March 1981 resulted in the
award of thirteen leases for a total bonus of $449,178,059
to the State. In 1982, facing a s~rious shortfall in State
revenues, the Department of Conservation and Natural Re-
sources conducted the entire pre-lease sale process for a
second sale in only sixty days. The September 1982 sale
resulted in the award of just one lease for a bonus bid of
$3,117,000. For the 1981 sale, the average accepted bid per
acre was $8,156; for the 1982 sale it was $2,406.
The pre-lease sale schedule for the August 1984 State
offering was set up without any significant political
pressures on the State Lands Division; it is expected to be
a guide for future Alabama sale schedules. The Call for
Nominations was issued September 1, 1983 and the Deadline
for Nominations was seven months later. Tract nominations
could be submitted by any party, but industry interests
served as the basis for the State's initial determi-
nations.~/ A month after the nominations deadline,
Preliminary Tract Selection was announced; approximately two
weeks later a public hearing was held. Deadline for Com-
ments was two weeks following the hearing; and one week
after the deadline, Final Tract Selection was made. A week
after the final selection, the Legal Notice of Sale was
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issued and approximately two months later, on August 14,
1984, the sale was held. The Governor, at the Commis-
sioner's recommendation, accepted 18 high bids for a total
bonus of $347,483,000 or an average bid per acre of $4,630;
six high bids on additional tracts were rejected as in-
sufficient. The leases awarded had a five-year primary
term, an annual rental of $5 per acre and a 25 percent
royalty after payout.~/
Reviewing the results of sales subsequent to the Mary
Ann Field discovery, in Alabama's 1981 offering, 116 bids
were received for 35 tracts, 13 leases were awarded, and the
per acre average of bids accepted was $8,160. In 1982, 9
bids were received for 6 tracts, 1 was accepted, and the
winning bid offered $2,406 per acre. In 1984, 58 bids were
received for 24 tracts, 18 leases were awarded, and the
average bonus was $4,630. Analysis of these results sug-
gests that comp~tition for the best tracts following the
1979 discovery was very strong in 1981, with many bids and
high average bonuses per acre. In 1982, the State rushed
its sale process to raise operating funds and statistics
make clear that neither the industry nor the State was happy
with the results. In 1984, the State held what it hopes
will become a "model sale" and while the results were not as
impressive as in the 1981 offering, they were relatively
good.
The rejection of bids for five tracts in 1982, consider-
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ing the political pressures to raise revenues, made clear
Alabama's commitment to ensuring the highest reasonable
returns on its offshore resources. .~ simple comparison of
Federal and State sale results is startling in this regard.
In the August 1984 State sale, the average bid per acre from
all those received was $3,470i four months earlier in the
Central Gulf of Mexico OCS Planning Area Lease Sale 81, the
second areawide sale in the area, the averagp. per acre bid
of all those received was $580.24/
While the number of tracts available in the two sales
was very different, and the geology of the lands in the
offerings covering vast areas of the Gulf of Mexico varied
widely, the results are striking and the analysis to follow
of Alabama's environmental restrictions and fee structure
will only make more apparent the wide differential.
Cost Structure
Along with numerous other facets, the fee and royalty
requirements for each offshore lease sale vary. For the
August 1984 lease sale, the State required a $25 fee for
each tract nominated.~/ Royalty rates up to the point of
payout varied and were part of the bidi following payout the
royalty rate was set at 25 percent on all tracts. Among the
accepted bids for the August 1984 sale, ten leases had
pre-payout royalty rates of 16.67 percent and eight had
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rates of 20 percent.~1 In addition to the leases awarded
in the 1984 sale, Alabama has eighteen active offshore
leases. The four leases issued in 1969 that form the Mary
Ann Field have royalty rates of 16.67 percent. The one
lease awarded in 1982 has a rate of 25 percent and for the
thirteen leases awarded in the 1982 sale, the royalty rates
are 25 percent (seven leases); 27 percent (four leases), and
28 percent (two leases). Rental fees for the 1969 leases
were set at $1 per acre per year~ since that sale the annual
rates have been set at $5 per year. All active leases had
primary terms of five years.~1
Effective January 1, 1984, the State Legislature acted
to lower Alabama's severance taxes on offshore production
obtained from depths greater than 18,000 feet below mean sea
level from 8 to 6 percent (Act No. 83-889). As all recent
discoveries have been made in the Norphlet formation which
lies at depths greater than 20,000 feet, this new tax rate
was to serve as an incentive to offshore development. In
addition to the 6 percent severance (or privilege tax), the
State has a 2 percent production tax, so that the effective
rate on offshore production is currently 8 percent.~1
On all Federal leases in the Gulf of Mexico OCS Region,
the royalty rate is 16.67 percent and there are no sever-
ance, privilege, or production taxes. The differential
between State and Federal royalty and tax rates has been a
source of concern to State regulators and industry officials
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since the 1979 Mary Ann discoverY.~1 The Alabama Petroleum
Council, an industry group associated with the American
Petroleum Institute, has repeatedly warned State legislators
that operators will choose to produce from Federal leases
adjacent to Alabama waters rather than pay the State's high
tax rates. However, given the industry's continuing high
level of activity and Mobil Oil's plans to initiate produc-
tion on the Mary Ann Field, it is clear that Alabama's high
royalty and tax rates are not a determining factor in a
significant number of cases. It is impossible to determine
in how many instances operators did choose to work in
Federal waters rather than State as a result of the cost
differential, for industry officials guard such competitive
information closely.
Local governments in Alabama have no ability to annex
offshore lands or tax any activity in State waters. Levies
on oil and gas facilities related to offshore work that are
located within their jurisdictions are allowed, however.ill
Revenue Distribution
Under the 1975 Alabama Code Section 19-17-68, ninety
percent of revenues from bonus bids, royalties, and rentals
collected by the State Lands Division of the Department of
Conservation and Natural Resources is paid into the general
funds of the State. The remaining ten percent of these
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funds is appropriated to the Lands Division to pay its
administration costs.
In the legislation amending severance tax rates, ef-
fective January 1, 1984 (Act No. 83-889), the distribution
of those taxes was also determined. Under Section 40-20-8
of the 1975 Alabama Code (as amended Janua~y 1, 1984),
ninety percent of severance taxes are to be deposited in the
State's general fund. The remaining ten percent of the
taxes is to be distributed to the county adjacent to the
waters where the taxed oil or gas was produced. This money
is to be expended at the discretion of the county governing
body.
The State's leasing and regulatory process for offshore
oil and gas development has no allowance for county or
municipal participation beyond the right to comment at
appropriate points as afforded all parties. The revenue
sharing clause in the legislation amending the State's
severance tax rates thus can be seen to have little effect
on Alabama's program in the future when offshore production
is initiated.
Post-Lease Regulation
Once the Department of Conservation and Natural Re-
sources has finalized an operator's offshore lease, three
agencies take on significant roles in the regulatory
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process--the State Oil and Gas Board, the State Department
of Environmental Manaqement, and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers. The State has sought to carefully protect its
marine and estuarine resources, thus the permitting process,
in the past, has often proven long and arduous. It took
Mobil Oil nearly a decade to gain approval for its 1979
exploratory well, the first in State waters since 1952, and
following the 1982 State lease sale, it took sixteen months
for work on the first exploratory wells on those leases to
be fully approved. In both cases, the operators remained
anxious and accommodating to the regulatory agencies
throughout the period leading to permit approval. The high
level of activity and the streamlining of approval processes
are expected to lead to more timely approvals for explora-
tory work in the future. It is too early to predict how the
approval process in State waters will proceed for develop-
ment and production work as the first, and as yet only,
project is only currently in the planning and preparatory
stages.
State Oil and Gas Board
The State Oil and Gas Board is charged under the 1975
Alabama Code, Sections 9-17-1 through 9-17-32, with regula-
tion of State oil and gas industries, issuance of drilling
permits, and formulation of regulations and standards for
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operations including the development of pollution regula-
tions. The goals of the Board's actions are generally to
prevent the waste of the State's oil and gas resources, and
to protect the correlative rights of landowners and lease-
holders.321 The Board, more specifically, is responsible
for requiring that oil and gas drilling be conducted so as
to prevent seepage between separate oil and gas strata,
preventing the pollution of fresh water supplies by oil,
gas, or saltwater, preventing the drowning by water of any
stratum capable of producing oil or gas, and preventing
other manner of blowouts, caving, or seepage.lll Examples
of the Board's duties include inspection of records and
field operations, promulgation of rules and regulations
(subject to public hearings), assignment of production
allowables, maintenance of well records, and imposition of
pooling or utilization actions.
The Board is composed of three members appointed by the
Governor to serve staggered six-year terms. The State Geo-
logist, who is appointed by the President of the University
of Alabama with the confirmation of the Governor, serves as
Oil and Gas Supervisor.l!l The Supervisor is responsible
for carrying out the formal regulations, duties, and deci-
sions of the Board, and serves as ex officio Secretary of
the Board.~1
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Alabama Department of Environmental Management
The second State agency with a significant role in the
post-lease regulatory process is the Alabama Department of
Environmental Management (ADEM). In 1982, ADEM was estab-
lished through the consolidation of a number of small State
agencies, including the Alabama Coastal Area Board, the
Water Improvement Commission, the Pollution Control Finance
Authority, and the Air Pollution Control Commission.~/ The
consolidated agency is responsible for dealing with, inter
alia, air and water pollution, solid and hazardous wastes,
water quality and treatment systems, and coastal zone
management as well as related permitting regulatory and
enforcement functions. Overseeing the agency, its
directors, and staff, is the seven member Environmental
Management Commission. In an advisory role to the Com-
mission is the Coastal Resources Advisory Committee.ll/
While ADEM has no role in the leasing process, its
regulatory power over the offshore hydrocarbon development
process in Alabama is significant. The agency issues water
quality certification under Section 401 of the Clean Water
Act for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 404 permits; reviews
Corps permits for Section 10 of the River and Harbor Act,
and Section 404 of the Clean Water Act to establish coastal
zone management consistency; and has the authority for im-
plementing the National Pollutant and Discharge Elimination
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System in the State.~/
The State of Alabama currently enforces a "zero dis-
charge policy" for offshore operators within the State's
jurisdiction. This policy was first set out in the mid-
1970s by a "blue ribbon" commission appointed by the
Governor. The Commission's findings were based on a study
of the Mobile Bay coastal zone, a review of past drilling
operations, and a review of the standing rules of the State
Oil and Gas Board which prohibited the discharge of oil in
any form, drilling muds, and cuttings, additives, and solid
wastes.~/
In July 1981, the various State agencies and commissions
responsible for water quality in Alabama (most of whom were
soon to be consolidated into ADEM), issued a State position
statement in an attempt to coordinate oil and gas regulatory
and permitting activities in Mobile Bay between themselves
and the Federal government. Significant facets of the
statement included:
o
o
o
the prohibition against discharge of any pollutants
into the water;
the permitting of only the absolute minimum number
of exploratory drilling rigs, production platforms,
wells, transportation corridors, and pipelines
justified by the industry; and
establishment of a continual monitoring program to
measure and analyze ecosystem impacts in State
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waters.40/
While neither ADEM or the State Oil and Gas Board fund
ongoing research or the regular collection of baseline en-
vironmental data, the other facets of this policy statement
have been implemented. Limitations on the number of drill-
ing rigs and development operations, as well as the zero
discharge policy, are regulated through permitting. The
zero discharge policy has also been set out in lease stipu-
lations in the last three State offshore sales. A section
of the lease form used in the 1982 sale read as follows:
LESSEE shall use all means at its disposal to
recapture all escaped hydrocarbons or other pol-
lutants and shall be liable for all damages to
aquatic or marine life, wildlife, birds, and any
public or private property unless the discharge or
other polluting condition was the result of an act
of war, an act of government, an act of God, or an
act or omission of a third party acting without the
consent of the LESSEE.
Responsibility for enforcing the zero discharge policy
and other permit stipulations is shared by four agencies.
Inspectors from the State Oil and Gas Board and Army Corps
of Engineers regularly visit offshore platforms to oversee
operations and review the records kept of hydrocarbon and
waste production, storage, and transportation. Environ-
mental inspectors from ADEM and law enforcement officers
from the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources
also regularly patrol the waters surrounding offshore
platforms for signs of any illegal discharges.
At the 17th Annual Offshore Technology Conference in
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Houston, Texas, during May 1985, two representatives of
Exxon USA presented information on the company's experience
working in Alabama State waters.!!/ Exxon has interpreted
State regulations and lease stipulations to prohibit the
discharge of all drilling fluids, formation cuttings,
cement, contaminated deck drainage, sewage treatment unit
effluent, produced formation water, engine cooling water,
and other pollutants. In the Exxon operations cited in the
study, all such wastes were collected in barges moored ad-
jacent to the drilling rigs. Barges were then transported
to waste unloading facilities onshore for processing and
disposal.
The study considered the results from three wells Exxon
completed in Alabama waters during 1983-84. It was found
that most existing drilling rigs required modifications to
containment systems and plumbing in order to collect and
route all wastes to the barges, but that some recently
constructed rigs incorporated these systems into their
design and original construction.
The largest single cost for zero discharge compliance
was for onshore processing and disposal of drilling wastes.
Overall the two major factors determining waste volume
generated on board the rigs were drill hole sizes and total
days of operation. Exxon employed four additional personnel
on each of its rigs to maintain and operate the waste col-
lection equipment on a twenty-four hour a day basis.
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The study concluded that inclusive costs for zero dis-
charge compliance ranged from 13.7 to 22.1 percent of total
well cost; a breakdown of cost percentages is presented on
Table 3. Only for one of the three wells drilled was rig
modification required; that cost was 3.6 percent of total
well cost. Costs for onshore waste disposal varied from 6.0
to 8.5 percent of total well cost.
Since discovery of the Lower Mobile Bay-Mary Ann Field
in December 1979, there has been only one significant viola-
tion of Alabama's zero discharge policy. During the period
from spring 1981 through June 1982, there were unlawful,
willful discharges from rigs drilling to delineate the Mary
Ann Field. Mobil Oil admitted the spills occurred and
agreed to pay $2 million in penalties after the Alabama
Attorney General filed a suit based on violations of the
State's Water Pollution Control Act. The company also
agreed to pay for cleanup of the pollution, estimated to
cost approximately $500,000; fired fifteen employees, dis-
ciplined eight; and transferred all other personnel who had
worked on the Mobile Bay operation. The civil penalty was
the largest in the State's history and following settlement
the Attorney General stated, "We welcome the responsible
development of Alabama's abundant fossil fuel resources, but
at the same time we are fully committed to protecting our
irreplacable waterways and shorelines."~/ The penalties
collected were put into funds for law enforcement, environ-
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Percentages of Total Well Costs
ITEM WELL "A" WELL "S" WELL "C'
RIG MODIFICATION N/A N/A 3.6
BARGE MODIFICATION 3.2 0.5 3.0
TUG AND BARGE RENTAL 4.1 3.2 2.9
BARGE MOORING SYSTEM 3.1 2.2 4.2(PILES. ANCHORS. ETC.)
EXTRA SUPERVISION
3.2AND CONTRACT LABOR 1.8 2.1
WASTE DISPOSAL 8.5 6.0 6.1
TOTAL 22.1 13.7 21.9
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Table 3. Exxon Estimated Costs of Compliance with Alabama
Zero Discharge Stipulation and Location of Wells Drilled.
(Carlton and Darby, "Drilling Operations Under 'No
Discharge' Restrictions," 4:544.).
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mental management, and the monitoring of Mobil Oil wells in
State waters.
Following an investigation where it was established that
discharges were made while wastes were being transferred
between compartments in the holding barge, Mobil Oil set up
new operating procedures. The company maintained that all
discharges took place against direct orders and its new
system sought to avoid future transgressions. Among other
changes, a system of measures and records was put in place
to monitor waste barge displacement and transfers, brighter
barge lighting systems were installed, only the drilling
supervisor was given keys to pump controls, and unscheduled
inspections were initiated.iil
u.s. Army Corps of Engineers
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is the third agency
having a significant role in post-lease regulation of oil
and gas activity in Alabama waters. Specifically, Section
10 of the River and Harbor Act of 1899 prohibits construc-
tion in navigable waters, or the excavation, deposit, or
accomplishment of any other work affecting the course, loca-
tion, conditions, or capacity of such waters unless the work
has been authorized by the Secretary of the Army. Also,
under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the Secretary
issues permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material
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into navigable waters.44/
As the regulatory process has developed in the period
following the 1979 Mary Ann Field discovery, the Corps
approval, and the time required for it, has become the
determining factor for an offshore operator anxious to
initiate exploratory drilling. Following the 1981 State
offshore lease sale the first permits were received from the
Corps only after sixteen months of review. Prior to sub-
mitting an application to the Army, the operator must
complete an extensive site survey including analysis of
cultural and historic resources, benthic flora and fauna,
and bottom hazards. According to Dr. Harlan Johnson,
manager of Exxon's operations in the Mobile Bay region, this
survey requires approximately one month of work.i2/ Along
with the survey, applicants submit detailed project descrip-
tions including drawings, lists of adjoining property
owners, and status of approvals or certifications required
by other Federal and State agencies. The application an
offshore operator must make to the Corps is the most
thorough, expensive, and time consuming to prepare of all
those required for work in Alabama waters.
Following completion of an application, public notice is
issued and a thirty-day comment period begins; during this
period a public hearing may be held. The Corps states that
evaluation and approval once the public comment period is
closed, if there ace no serious objections, should take
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approximately sixty days. In 1967, the Secretaries of the
Army and Interior signed an agreement regarding the Corps
permit approval process. Prior to 1967, the Corps saw its
basic role as protecting navigation channels; under the
Secretaries' agreement, however, the Corps agreed to give
all facets of environmental impacts equal consideration and
consult closely with other Federal agencies, such as the
Fish and Wildlife Service, in the course of reviewing
permits.~1
Prior to approval of permits by the Corps, ADEM issues
its water quality certification under Section 401 of the
Clean Water Act and consistency determination under the
Coastal Zone Management Act.ill Other approvals required
prior to initiation of drilling include a drilling permit
from the State Oil and Gas Board, a very technical,
engineering-oriented certification that takes place
approximately six weeks to be evaluated; clearance from the
State Department of Conservation and Natural Resources for
the specific location of a well, as required in lease stipu-
lations; air quality certification from ADEM; a license from
the State Docks Department for placement of a structure in
navigable waters; and permits for navigational aids from the
U.S. Coast Guard.~1
Under its authorities based on the Clean Water Act and
River and Harbor Act, the Corps completed in November 1984 a
Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GElS) for Ex-
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ploration and Production of Hydrocarbon Resources in Coastal
Alabama and Mississippi. The Corps' GElS sets out to assess
cumulative effects of resource development on Mississippi
and Alabama's coastal waters and the adjacent Federal OCS.
This information will be used by the District Engineer in
deliberations concerning future permit applications.
In cases where there are no serious complicating fac-
tors, that is, where the proposed work site is "clean," the
GElS will allow for the streamlining of the Corps permitting
process as no public comment period will be required. Ac-
cording to Dr. Johnson of Exxon, the GElS is only expected
to be employed in a very limited number of cases, as finding
a site that all parties concerned agree is "clean" is rare,
and in any case the GElS can only cut approximately thirty
days from the process.~/
Summary
In analyzing the offshore oil and gas leasing and
regulatory system that has been developed by the State of
Alabama since discovery of the Mary Ann Field in 1979, three
conclusions are most significant: (1) Leasing, exploration,
and development activity is proceeding at a strong and
increasing pace; (2) revenues to the State from offshore
activity are significantly higher than those received by the
Federal government on adjacent OCS lands based on per acre
57
bonus bids, and potential royalty rate, and severance and
production tax revenues; and (3) though tracts have not yet
been developed, the State has placed very stringent and
costly environmental restrictions on offshore operators
relative to Federal regulation.
The increasingly high level of activity in Alabama's
waters is clearly a result of the fact that every well
drilled in the Norphlet formation from State blocks has
produced significant gas reserves. Industry sources had
argued that Alabama's high tax and royalty rates, as well as
stringent environmental protection regulations, would limit
offshore exploration and development. It is impossible to
ascertain whether some operators have in fact not ventured
into Alabama waters for these reasons, but at the present
time the limiting factor on industry activity levels is the
time and work required to complete the regulatory process
rather than any lack of interest.
The State of Alabama remains very protective of its
coastal waters, as the Bay environment, due to its small
size and shallow waters, is seen as extremely vulnerable.
The 1982 suit against Mobil Oil for illegal discharges into
the Bay clarified the State's position and the severity with
which violations would be treated. As exploration activity
has increased and development plans have been put forth,
relaxation of the zero discharge policy has not been set out
as a serious proposal by either State or industry officials.
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While State legislators did act to lower severance taxes
from deep wells by two percent effective January 1, 1984,
costs of operating in Alabama's waters remain very high in
comparison to adjacent Federal DCS lands. Results of the
September 1982 State leasing offering, where only one bid
was accepted while political pressures to raise revenues
were high, made clear Alabama's commitment to maximizing
returns from the limited number of offshore tracts within
its jurisdiction. Continuing high levels of activity are
evidence of offshore operators' belief that there are
profits to be made from offshore gas reserves even with
royalty rates as high as 28 percent, 8 percent severance and
production taxes, $5 per acre annual rental rates, bonus
bids many times higher than those offered for nearby Federal
blocks, and zero discharge restrictions on all operations.
For the future, there are questions as to how absolutely
effective the State's environmental regulations will be as
numerous, large-scale development projects are put in place,
or how development will proceed once lower cost Federal
lands adjacent to State blocks are brought into production.
At present, however, Alabama's commitment to maximizing
revenue returns from offshore lands while minimizing en-
vironment degradation would appear strong and successful.
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CHAPTER III
THE TEXAS PROGRAM
The first oil well in Texas was drilled in 1866 and in
1928 the State became the nation's leader in oil produc-
tion. Texas hydrocarbons accounted for 19.5 percent of
domestic energy produced in 1983, including 35.5 percent of
natural gas and 27.8 percent of oil. The petroleum industry
employed one out of every eighteen workers in Texas in 1983
and more than 50 percent of State revenues were attributable
to the industry. As J. C. Walter, Jr., Chairman of the
Texas Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association, has said, "The
Texas petroleum industry is the cornerstone of the economy
of our State as a major employer and primary source of tax
revenue at State and local levels.n~/
In waters off the Texas Gulf Coast the first oil and gas
lease was awarded in 1922; the first well spudded in 1938;
and the first production initiated in 1940. In 1984 the
State's leases in Gulf of Mexico waters produced 2.9 million
barrels of crude oil and 176 billion cubic feet of natural
gas. Since 1932 more than $4.5 billion has been deposited
into the Texas Permanent School Fund, much of it revenues
from the lease and production of offshore oil and gas re-
sources.~/
From this series of facts and figures concerning the
petroleum industry in Texas the industry's long and impor-
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tant history in the State is clear, as is the fact that the
State has interests in supporting continued high levels of
oil and gas development. The prosperity of Texas is direct-
ly related to the prosperity of the petroleum industry. At
the same time the State has the responsibility to assure
receipt of fair returns from the production of public re-
sources and to protect the environment for its citizens and
the future. In considering the State's management program
for offshore oil and gas resources, as it has developed
since 1922, the efficiency of the program and effectiveness
of its environmental analysis stand out.
State Jurisdiction
The State of Texas' boundary in the Gulf of Mexico was
established on May 31, 1960, when the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in the case of United States v. Louisiana,
Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida (363 U.S. 1, 121
(1960)). The instant proceeding was initiated in 1955 when
the United States initially sought to establish its juris-
diction over the continental shelf off Louisiana beyond the
territorial sea boundary lying three geographic miles off
the coast. While the original case brought by the U.S. only
concerned the submerged lands and minerals off Louisiana,
following preliminary procedures which included presentation
of an amicus curiae brief by Texas, the Court ordered the
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suit broadened to include all States bordering the Gulf. In
the order issued June 24, 1957, the Court stated:
the issues in this litigation are so related to the
possible interests of Texas, and other States situ-
ated on the Gulf of Mexico, in the subject matter of
this suit, that the just, orderly, and effective
determination of such issues requires that they be
adjudicated in a proceeding in which all the in-
terested parties are before the Court.il
The Supreme Court found in 1960 that Texas, as an
independent nation prior to its admission into the Union,
had a three-league maritime boundary. In the Republic Ot
Texas declaration of independence from Mexico its boundaries
were described, in part, as "beginning at the mouth of the
Sabine River, and running west along the Gulf of Mexico
three leagues from land, to the mouth of the Rio Grande."!/
In the joint resolution of Congress annexing Texas the ter-
ritory "properly included within, and rightfully belonging
to the Republic of Texas" created the State of Texas,
"subject to the adjustment by this government of all ques-
tions of boundary that may arise with other governments."2/
The Court in reviewing the history leading to passage of
the U.S. Congress' joint resolution of annexation found no
reference to maritime boundaries. Further, the Court found
that the limiting "properly," "rightfully," and "adjustment"
clauses of the resolutions were included only as references
to continuing disputes over boundaries with Mexico. The
Court felt that the rest of the resolution's wording was
meant to validate any boundary asserted by Texas without
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protest; thus, the State of Texas was created by Congress
with a three-league maritime boundary (approximately 10.35
statute miles).
Argument were made that even if Texas entered the Union
with a three-league offshore jurisdiction, from the moment
of admission the boundary was limited to three miles by
virtue of the U.S. foreign policy fixing the extent of the
territorial sea at that point. The Court ruled, however,
that boundaries were set by virtue of Congressional autho-
rity to admit States to the Union, not by virtue of the
Executive power to determine this country's obligations to
foreign states. While in certain circumstances the
Executive did have rights to limit States' enjoyment of
jurisdictional authority, those rights did not extend to
fixing a boundary. The Court put forth no views on the
effectiveness of a three-league boundary off Texas as
against other nations, given the U.S. claim of only three
miles. In settling the Texas claims the Court also
recognized the State's unique position of being the only
independent nation annexed into the Union.~/
Leasing Activity
The State of Texas exercises dominion over 2,428,537
acres of submerged lands in the Gulf of Mexico; these lands
are divided into approximately 5,800 tracts for leasing
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purposes·21 The number of tracts is inexact as blocks will
often be divided into four sectors for specific lease
offerings, most often at the request of offshore oil and gas
operators. The average size of offshore leasing tracts is
640 acres, while the legal limit is a three square mi1~
block of 5,760 acres. The mapping system for the offshore
is based on the Texas Plane Coordinate System extended from
onshore.~1
In 1984, just over half the Texas Gulf Coast submerged
acreage was under active 1ease.~1 Due to the long history
of activity offshore Texas and the high level of successful
exploratory drilling, nearly every tract offshore has been
leased at one point or another; some blocks have been leased
numerous times. Many communities along Texas' 400 mile
coast have experienced a significant level of activity over
many years related to work offshore, among them: Houston,
Galveston, Beaumont, Port Arthur, and Orange.lQI
All State lands off the Gulf Coast are leased under the
authority of the School Land Board; the statute granting
such authority, Texas Code Chapter 52 (Oil and Gas Sub-
chapter A, 52.011), reads simply: "The School Land Board
may lease to any person for the production of oil and
natural gas: • the portion of the Gulf of Mexico within
the jurisdiction of the State." No goals, guidelines, or
restrictions on the leasing program are included in the
Code.
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The members of the School Land Board include: The
Commissioner of the General Land Office, one citizen ap-
pointed by the Governor, and another citizen appointed by
the State Attorney General. For many years the State's
Governors and Attorney Generals sat on the Board them-
selves. The Commissioner of the General Land Office is
elected in a Statewide race held every four years.!!/
Prior to the issuance of a Notice of Bids for each sale
the Board meets to approve the tracts to be offered, the
minimum bids required, and the terms of the sale. The Board
also meets on the day of each sale to open the submitted
bids and review them for approval. Recently, the Commis-
sioner of the General Land Office named a "Blue Ribbon
Committee" to serve as a technical advisory board on leasing
matters. The committee reports to the Governor and the
General Land Office.~/
The General Land Office is the government agency re-
sponsible for conducting the State's leasing program; this
includes not only lands under the authority of the School
Land" Board, but also onshore lands controlled by the Texas
Department of Correction, the Parks and Wildlife Department,
specific State hospitals and parks, the Department of Mental
Health and Mental Retardation, and other State agencies.
The Land Office holds sales for offshore School Board
lands twice a year, in the months of April and October.
Results from recent sales are presented on Table 4. Sale
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Lease Sales Tracts Offered Bids High Bids * Acres Leased Total Bonus Average Bid per Acre
April 1985 610 186 157 82,083 23,235,958 283.08
October 1984 697 289 222 106,474 27,775,916 260.84
April 1984 581 176 156 80,052 17,525,052 218.92
October 1983 1,409 526 387 241,891 29,124,776 120.40
October 1982 958 427 274 141 ,163 14,925,035 105.73
April 1982 902 336 262 161 ,088 16,796,262 104.27
-...J
0 October 1981 1,179 1,077 599 325,178 37,350,072 114.86
April 1981 1,282 1,100 669 388,767 38,258,041 98.41
October 1980 1,640 1,258 815 500,892 44,983,509 89.81
Apr it 1980 1,205 1,081 696 420,915 33,538,578 79.68
October 1979 1,610 702 548 359,736 25,199,109 70.05
rebruary 1979 1,856- 919 665 414,936 44,988,149 108.42
*These figures denote high bids accepted for lease award.
Table 4. Texas state Lease Sale Statistics 1979 through April 1985.
(Murphy Hawkins, Texas General Land Office, Austin, Interview
held July 1985.)
offerings of other State lands are usually held separately.
Nominations for unleased and unencumbered State offshore
tracts to be offered in a sale are accepted at any time from
industry. Approximately four months prior to an April or
October sale nominations for the upcoming sale are closed:
nominations received subsequent to the closing are consi-
dered for inclusion in the following sale. Approximately
two months prior to the sale date, the Land Office presents
information on the nominated tracts to the School Land
Board. The School Board approves the tracts to be offered,
usually all those nominated, the systems for bidding, mini-
mum bids, and other terms of the forthcoming sale.~/ A
sample set of terms and directives from a recent sale is
presented in Appendix 2. Given the Board's approval, the
Land Office prints and distributes an Oil and Gas Notice for
Bids, which includes descriptions of the authority under
which the sale will be conducted, the terms of the sale,
location and ownership of the tracts, bidding systems to be
used for each tract, environmental codes, and maps of the
lands.
In 1984 the Commissioner of the General Land Office,
acting with the concurrence of the other School Land Board
members, set a fee of $100 for each tract nomination made by
industry. This action was taken as at least a small effort
to trim the number of nominations received by the Land
Office, leading to an increase in competition for submerged
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lands offered in a given sale and a decrease in scenary
nominations (those made to mask offshore operators' true
interests).!!/ The $100 fee, to date, is perceived as a
success in limiting nominations to those where some real
level of interest exists, according to Land Office offi-
cials.~/ If a nominated tract is somehow encumbered or for
some other reason cannot be offered in the next eligible
sale, the fee is returned.
On the day of the sale the School Land Board meets in
the Commissioner's offices and bids are opened. Later that
same day bids are reviewed and awards of leases are approved
by the Board. A successful bid must include a completed bid
form, copies of which are distributed with the Notice for
Bids; a check for the bonus bid; and a processing fee of 1.5
percent of the bonus bid amount. Checks included with an
unsuccessful bid are returned.
The system developed in Texas, with its semi-annual
sales, has operated over the past decade smoothly and effi-
ciently. The regular schedule of sales and the nomination
process has made State offshore lands readily available to
industry on a relatively assured schedule. State leasing
officials are confident that leasing will continue in the
future under similar terms.~/ Along with the introduction
of nomination fees, the State has also moved in other ways
over recent years to increase returns from public resources
and better protect its environment. Other examples of these
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efforts follow.
Cost Structure
Award of State leases in the Gulf of Mexico is based
upon either high royalty rate or bonus bidding. Minimum
royalty rates for State resources are set by law at one-
eighth oil or gas produced and saved, or its value; but
royalty rates in recent history have almost always been
higher.!2/
In 1984, along with the introduction of the $100 nomi-
nation fee for lease sales, a minimum bid system was put in
place. Minimum bids for each tract offered are set by the
School Land Board with the advice of the General Land
Office. Factors weighed by the Land Office in determining
their recommendations include: geologic data, the history
of activity on the land, activity nearby, and perceived
interest in the block.~/ Prior to initiation of the
minimum bid system royalty rates were generally set at
twenty-five percent and award of leases was based on high
bonus bid.
Reviewing the terms of the April 2, 1985 Texas oil and
gas lease sale, as related to the 282 tracts offered in the
Gulf of Mexico, all but two blocks were leased based on high
bonus bid with a fixed twenty-five percent royalty. With
the set royalty, 113 tracts had minimum bids of $100 per
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acre; 126 tracts had minimums of $200 per acre; 16 had
minimums of $300; and 30 tracts had $500 minimums. The two
other tracts were offered with a set bonus bid of $200 per
acre and royalty rate bids were the basis of award with a
minimum of twenty-five percent. All of the tracts offered
in the Gulf had an annual rental rate, after the first year,
of $10 per acre, and the leases' primary terms ran for five
years.~/
If commercial production is initiated on an offshore
lease and the payment of royalties begins, the lessee no
longer pays rental fees on the acreage. Shut-in royalties
are also prescribed in the oil and gas regulations. The
lease for acreage where a shut-in well capable of producing
oil or gas in paying quantities exists may be extended for
up to five years through payment of shut-in royalties. The
payment is set at double the annual rental provided for in
the lease, but not less than $1,200 a year per well. If,
during the shut-in period, oil or gas is produced on another
lease from a well within 1,000 feet of the shut-in lease and
any drainage from the shut-in reservoir is occurring, the
right to extend the lease through shut-in royalty payments
is voided.~/
The introduction of the nomination fee and minimum bid
systems to the Texas offshore leasing process were the
result of an review called for by the then newly elected
Texas Land Commissioner, Garry Mauro. The new Commis-
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sioner's concern was aroused by the comparison of Federal
OCS average bonus bids to Texas bonus bid revenues from
offshore lands. In the last five Federal Gulf of Mexico OCS
nomination process lease sales held prior to 1983, the
average bonus per acre was $2,119; in the Federal areawide
lease sale held in the western Gulf during August 1983, the
average bonus per acre was $668.~/ In the five Texas State
offshore lease sales of Permanent School Fund lands held
prior to 1983 the average bonus per acre was $103.~/
While these numbers are not entirely comparable (royalty
rates on leased tracts varied widely between State and
Federal waters, the Federal nomination sales included sub-
merged lands from throughout the Gulf of Mexico OCS, and the
Texas Permanent School Fund sales included some onshore
lands), the wide difference in average bonus bids per acre
is startling even when allowances are made for wide varia-
tions in oil and gas geological potential. Commissioner
Mauro initiated a review of Texas leasing practices offshore
upon his taking authority over the General Land Office in
1983; in the April lease sale of that year, no offshore
tracts were offered.
In the October 1983 State sale, 1,409 tracts were
offered and 526 bids were received; of these, 387 were high
bids. From the high bids, 22 were rejected as insufficient;
prior to this sale, State practice had been to accept all
high bids in land sales.23/ The average bonus per acre of
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accepted bids was $120. Following this sale, the nomination
fee and minimum bid systems were implemented permanently.
In reviewing the results of Texas State lease sales
before and after the imposition of nomination fees and
minimum bids, a number of trends seem clear (see Table 4).
The average bonus bid per acre has more than doubled, while
total bonus revenues have not varied to any significant
extent. The total number of tracts offered in individual
sales has fallen, as has the number of high bids and total
acres leased. So while the State has kept bonus revenues at
a steady level, the acreage of lands leased has fallen
significantly--Ieading to the conclusion that Texas is
receiving increased returns on the more limited hydrocarbon
resources it has recently been leasing.
It is possible, though, that with less acreage being
leased, royalty revenues may begin decreasing in the future,
as the lesser amounts of lands leased lead to a commensurate
fall in production. Production rates, especially for natu-
ral gas, are very closely tied to market demands, however;
therefore a number of factors, other than a decrease in
leased acreage over a one and a half year period, are likely
to effect royalty revenues in the future to a much greater
extent.
In analyzing the leasing data available before and after
the introduction of nomination fees and minimum bids, it
must be recognized that many variables are affecting lease
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sale results, and that the results over such a short period
of time cannot define major, long-term trends. Three of the
most significant factors affecting Texas offshore lease sale
results in the 1980s, other than minimum bid and nomination
fee requirements, have been the (1) worldwide oversupply of
natural gas, which has greatly decreased prices in the U.S.
since the collapse of an industry boom in 1981; (2) varia-
tions in the price of a barrel of oil, which have an inverse
effect on demand for natural gas; and (3) introduction of
areawide leasing on the Federal OCS, which has led to vast
increases in leased OCS acreage in the Gulf of Mexico.
Severance taxes in Texas are prescribed in the State
Natural Resources Code, Title 3, Subtitle 1; there are no
production taxes as exist in Alabama. The severance tax on
gas is 7.5 percent of market value at the mouth of the well,
or 7.5 percent of the producer's gross receipts if the gas
is sold for cash. For oil, the tax rate is 4.6 percent of
the hydrocarbon's market value; there is a minimum tax of
4.6 cents for each barrel of 42 standard gallons of oil
produced.
An ongoing issue in Texas concerning the jurisdiction of
local authorities over State offshore development and their
ability to tax offshore wells was resolved during 1983. In
1979, the City of Port Arthur, using its powers as a home
rule city under Texas law, annexed a one-mile wide strip of
the Gulf of Mexico extending out to the three-marine league
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line. The area annexed included an oil production platform
owned by the Superior Oil Company and the City made clear
the fact that the annexation was undertaken simply to raise
revenues. The City cited the loss of Federal Coastal Energy
Impact Program funding, the high cost of public services
to the offshore operators, the dislocation of a long-
established shrimp fleet from scarce dock space, and other
socioeconomic factors as justification for its actions. An
ad valorem tax was placed on the tract Superior had leased
from the State; in 1981 the local government's tax levy
amounted to $775,000. Other home rule cities on the coast
also moved to annex portions of the Gulf, including
Galveston, Corpus Christi, and Crystal Beach.
Many of the arguments put forth by Texas coastal cities
concerning the direct costs of offshore oil and gas activi-
ties to their communities are similar to arguments made at
the national level by proponents of OCS revenue sharing
between Federal and coastal State governments. Revenue
sharing is seen by many as the most viable and direct means
for easing conflicts over OCS development.~/ Revenue
sharing never became a serious political issue between
coastal cities and the Texas State government, possibly
because nearly all revenues go to the State's higher
education system, so the issue, though most interesting,
falls outside the scope of this study.
The State of Texas and Superior Oil brought suits to
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block Port Arthur's annexation, but in March 1984, following
a long series of rulings by lesser courts, the u.s. Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in the City's favor (Superior
Oil v. City of Port Arthur, 82-2396). The U.S. Supreme
Court dismissed an appeal. Following this decision, Port
Arthur received the more than $3 million in taxes from
Superior Oil that had been held in escrow pending final
adjudication of the case.
Following Port Arthur's 1979 action, annexation became
an important issue in the Texas State Legislature--as the
threat to State offshore revenues was real and immediate.
With cities able to tax offshore operators independently on
properties anywhere in the State's Gulf waters, the industry
argued that work would quickly shift to adjacent Federal OCS
territories.
In 1980, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 1176 to
prohibit general law cities from annexing further than one
nautical mile into the Gulf; however, home rule cities, such
as Port Arthur, were exempt from this limitation. In 1983
the Legislature went on to approve Senate Bill 551 autho-
rizing home rule cities to annex out into the Gulf up to one
marine league and tax operators in that area at 100 percent
of the city's property tax rates. The new law also allowed
home rule cities to set up industrial districts in the
waters beyond one marine league out an additional 1.5
miles. In the industrial districts, home rule cities are
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allowed to tax at a rate not to exceed 35 percent of pro-
perty tax rates within the city. So while Port Arthur
received $3 million in taxes from Superior Oil based upon
its 1979 annexation, the State Legislature's 1983 actions
barred the city from continuing to tax Superior.~/
Revenue Distribution
Severance taxes collected by the State are used, in
part, to administer and enforce provisions of the Texas Code
as related to oil and gas activities. One half of one per-
cent of taxes collected are set aside in the State Treasury
for this purpose, with annual appropriations approved by the
State Legislature. Of the remaining severance taxes from
State Gulf waters, one fourth are credited to the Public
Free School Fund. The remaining three-fourths of the col-
lected severance taxes go into the State's general fund.26/
According to the Texas Code, Chapter 52 (Oil and Gas),
§ 52.241, "Distribution of Funds. The proceeds arising from
activities which affect lands belonging to the public free
school or the permanent fund of the several asylums, shall
be credited to the permanent funds of said respective
institutions." Based on this section of the Texas Code, a
total of more than $4.5 billion has been deposited in the
School Fund over the years, the great portion of which has
been collected from activity on State submerged lands. Of
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the $4.5 billion in revenues, approximately $3.01 billion
was from oil and gas royalties, while just under $1 billion
was received in bonus bids.27/
Revenues from coastal cities' property taxes on offshore
operators in the Gulf are collected and dispersed at the
discretion of the local jurisdictions.
Post-Lease Regulation
The Texas General Land Office through the Coastal
Division of its Land Management Program coordinates the
dissemination of a great deal of environmental information
on submerged tracts on a continuing basis. Through the
Resource Management Recommendation Code Project, environ-
mental codes are assigned to each submerged tract based on
factors such as environmentally sensitive habitats, recrea-
tional values, archeological sites, hydrology, navigational
safety, or other conditions that indicate the need for
special planning prior to on-tract development. Represen-
tatives of the following agencies meet regularly to review
and update the coding:
o Texas General Land Office
o
o
o
o
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
National Marine Fisheries Service
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Texas Antiquities Committee
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oo
Texas Parks and Wildlife Department
National Park Service.
The assigned codes concern activities such as dredging,
spoiling, drilling, time constraints on development work
near beaches, and seismic work on State lands. In the
Notice for Bids published prior to each sale, the assigned
codes for each tract to be offered are printed, along with
definitions and rationales for the codes, a key to the
agency responsible for assigning each code to a given tract,
and information on how to contact the agencies to discuss
concerns. A booklet including all of this information tor
every submerged tract in Texas is also available and the
Project has recently completed computerizing all of its data
to ease access and allow updates and changes to take place
more readily. For examples of coding data included in a
recent Notice For Bids see Appendix 3.
The coding system, which is very simply a means for
efficiently gathering and disseminating environmental in-
formation, was originally developed in 1972. In January
1985, a two-year, complete review and update of the codes
was finished; this included the work of computerizing the
data. The codes are for the use of offshore operators to
aid in preventing permitting delays and unnecessary
development costs. This, the Land Office states, is
accomplished by industry knowing the concerns of each
regulatory agency and incorporating this information in
82
pre-project design and planning.
In bold, capitalized letters at the head of the opening
page of the Project's description, it states "The codes are
seldom intended as absolute restrictions." The codes are
guides to preventing serious damage or alterations to
coastal and marine resources. To meet the goal of protect-
ing these resources and also allow for energy development,
negotiation between offshore operators and concerned
agencies is encouraged. The introduction to the codes also
states that tract development may go on unhindered if in-
dustry representatives can convince the concerned agencies
that work can proceed without the impacts anticipated.
Work with unavoidable impacts has, in cases, been
allowed to proceed following negotiations for mitigation.
Agreements reached with the State have called for mitigation
work improving areas approximately three times larger than
the total resource area being impacted, so that there is a
three to one recovery rate.
The State of Texas supports the Code Project in order to
accomplish three goals.
First, the codes suggest operating procedures that
encourage the protection of sensitive natural
resources. Second, the codes assist potential
bidders and lessees in developing plans that are
likely to receive more expeditious approval from
State and Federal agencies. Third, the codes
provide greater predictability in the leasing
process by somewhat reducing the uncertainties
associated with the development of state-owned
submerged land.~/
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To accomplish these goals that will benefit (1) offshore
operators, anxious to have their permits approved and limit
the risk of costly delays; (2) government regulators, with
various agencies working together to protect the environment
in an organized fashion where each is aware of what the
others are doing or not doing; and (3) citizens of Texas and
adjoining areas, enjoying the results of energy development
with a minimum of environmental disturbance, the coding
system would appear to work efficiently and effectively.
Once a lease has been issued by the General Land Office
and negotiations regarding environmental concerns have been
concluded or waived, the environmental codes serve as the
basis for stipulations. Enforcement of the stipulations is
the responsibility of the Enforcement Division of the Texas
Parks and Wildlife Department. The Department is governed
by the Parks and Wildlife Commission made up of six members
appointed by the Governor, with the concurrence of the State
Senate, for overlapping six-year terms. Overall the respon-
sibilities of the Department include, inter alia, regulation
and management of the State's wildlife resources, and promo-
tion and protection of persons and property in the operation
of vessels and equipment on public waters.~/ In the oil
and gas leasing process, the Department serves in an ad-
visory capacity to the General Land Office.
The Enforcement Division of the Parks and Wildlife
Department, through its conservation law officers, is
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charged with responsibility for environmental regulation
offshore in State waters. However, inspectors from the
Texas Railroad Commission and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
who regularly survey platforms offshore and review opera-
tions' records, in practice, playa more significant role in
ensuring that the stipulations included in permits are
followed.
In addition to the tract specific stipulations included
in leases issued by the General Land Office and enforced by
the Parks and Wildlife Department, the General Land Office
issues permits for geological and geophysical surveys on
State lands. The Office also promulgates general rules and
regulations to govern specific aspects of all oil and gas
operations in State waters. There are no set restrictions
regulating how close work can be conducted to shorelines,
but localities may stipulate their own limitations within
areas of their offshore jurisdiction. For example, Galves-
ton does not allow work within one and a half miles of its
shore and Corpus Christi sets a boundary for excluding oil
and gas activity two miles out.
The Texas Railroad Commission, made up of three elected
members serving overlapping six-year terms, also regulates
oil and gas operations within the State. Rules cover the
protection of water quality, disposal of operations-related
wastes, standards for casing and plugging wells, and moni-
toring, survey, and reporting requirements.
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Commission
permit and approval programs include well permits, disposal
by injection of salt water into productive and non-
productive oil and gas formations, general permits for
injection of fluids into production oil and gas reservoirs,
pipeline permits, and approvals for plugging abandoned or
non-producing wells.lQl In addition, the Commission issues
exemptions allowing for the sale of natural gas from public
lands outside the State. Under Texas Code, the Commission,
prior to allowing the sale of gas outside Texas, is required
to first establish that all needs for gas within the State
are met.
For the offshore operator seeking regulatory approval
for work on a newly awarded State lease in the Gulf, the
Railroad Commission permit and approval requirements for
operati6ns are not seen as a problem. The requirements are,
for the most part, very technical and the Commission pro-
cesses many applications from throughout the State in a
quick and relatively routine fashion.lll
Other State agencies with regulatory authority over
offshore operations within the three marine-league boundary
include the Department of Water Resources, which has re-
sponsibility for issuance of National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System permits and regulates oilspill prevention
and cleanup projects; the Air Control Board, which issues
air quality permits; and the Historical Commission, which
issues permits for the disturbance of archeological and
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vice, the State Parks and Wildlife Department, and the Texas
General Land Office; many of these same representatives are
involved in the Land Office's environmental coding project.
The Corps generally uses the environmental codes from
the State's leasing program as the basis for its permit
stipulations. If negotiations or mitigation agreements have
been concluded that allow specific codes to be waived, the
specific restrictions are simply left off the Corps permit.
Given the frequency of the Corps' review meetings and the
homogeneous nature of the Committees developing codes and
making recommendations concerning Corps permits, the process
usually results in very little delay and the issuance of the
required permits occurs in a timely fashion.ll/
Offshore operators, understanding the Corps' .practices,
often simply negotiate with the representatives of the con-
cerned agency that first called for a restriction code on a
given tract when, in fact, they are seeking permit approvals
from the Corps.34/
As the day to day routine has developed, the General
Land Office leaves the enforcement of stipulations to the
Corps except in the case of restrictions on geological and
geophysical survey work. The Corps in effect serves as an
important environmental permitting and enforcement arm of
the State. Given the large number of permits processed and
the detailed environmental data available to all concerned
from the initiation of the leasing process through codes,
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historical sites.~/ These various requirements are also
not perceived as difficulties for offshore operators anxious
to initiate work in State waters, once the concerns put
forth in the environmental codes have been negotiated.
The final agency with significant responsibilities for
the regulation of offshore activity in Texas waters is the
u.s. Army Corps of Engineers, as set out under Section 10 of
the River and Harbor Act of 1899 and Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act. As the day to day routine of environmental
permitting has developed for work in Texas waters, the Corps
has become the crucial permitting and enforcement autho-
rity. Under Corps regulations, each pending permit is
reviewed through the agency's public interest review pro-
cedures and Corps staff considers the proposed activities
effects on conservation, economics, flora and fauna, recre-
ation, navigation, water quality, and other factors. The
general environmental impact statement prepared for review
of oil and gas development activities in Texas coastal
waters is also utilized.
In practice, once every two weeks members of an inter-
agency committee are called to a meeting in Galveston by the
Corps to review Section 10 and Section 404 permits awaiting
approval. There are nineteen members on the review com-
mittee, but rarely do they all attend meetings. Regular
representatives to the gathering corne from the U.S. National
Marine Fisheries Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Ser-
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the system works quickly and efficiently.
Neither any Texas State agencies nor the Army Corps of
Engineers fund any long-term continuing environmental re-
search or baseline data gathering studies for use in making
leasing program policy or specific rulings. Work is con-
ducted by Texas universities and other agencies to study
coastal waters, but this is not done in conjunction with the
leasing program or with any clear coordination.
Summary
Three most significant conclusions stand out in con-
sidering the offshore oil and gas leasing and regulatory
system developed by the State of Texas since 1922 when the
first lease was awarded in State coastal waters: (1)
Leasing and development takes place in an orderly, pre-
dictable, and timely fashion; (2) the State has recently
taken action to increase competition for and revenues from
offshore resources; and (3) the environmental coding system
for making specific concerns on given tracts clear works
efficiently and effectively in making valuable information
available to the off.shore industry, government regulators,
and the public.
With semi-annual sales offering almost all the acreage
in which offshore operators express interest, the State
makes submerged lands available in a timely fashion. With
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the minimum acceptable bid on any tract published publicly,
the existence of an established routine for pre-sale acti-
vities and award of leases, and no history of significant
conflict or opposition to the offshore development program,
submerged lands are also leased in an orderly and predic-
table way.
The introduction of a $100 nomination fee for submerged
tracts, at least in a limited way, has cut down the number
of nominations received by the Texas General Land Office for
a given sale, resulting in increased competition for tracts
and a decrease in scenary nominations. The introduction of
a minimum acceptable bid system at the same time has re-
sulted in the doubling of average bonus bids per acre.
While the total acreage offered and leased has decreased on
average, total bonus bid revenues have remained relatively
steady. The average bonus per acre received in recent years
on Federal OCS tracts in the Gulf is significantly more than
the average received by the State, even when looking at
results with Texas' minimum bids in force and the areawide
leasing process in use for OCS lands. However, the royalty
rates in Texas waters, a greater source of revenue for the
State than bonus bids, generally are set at twenty-five
percent or more, compared to Federal rates averaging 16.67
percent. In addition, Texas has severance taxes on
production of oil and gas where OCS tracts do not.
The most unique and intriguing facet of the Texas
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leasing and regulatory system is use of the environmental
coding system. The Resource Management Recommendation Code
Project, which coordinates the concerns of all involved
regulatory agencies, makes available to the offshore
operators, from the outset of their interest in a given
tract, complete and timely data on the environmental
problems to be considered in exploration and development
work on the specific site. Guidelines for planning and
operations that would allay the concerns of regulatory
agencies are included, as is information on which agency
called for inclusion of the code stipulation and who to
contact at that agency to discuss the concern or alternative
operating procedures.
From the point of view of the offshore operator, all of
the environmental concerns of relevant parties are available
before any capital has been invested in preparing to bid on
any Texas submerged tract, thus the risks of future opposi-
tion to work are known. A good deal of the environmental
planning information th~t will be required prior to ini-
tiating exploration is also available in the codes, as is
data on sources of information for further details on
specific environmental questions.
From the point of view of government regulators, they
are aware, through the codes and the process of updating
them, of what other agencies' concerns are in given areas,
who exactly is dealing with which concerns, and where the
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gaps in knowledge are on a very specific basis.
From the citizen's point of view, offshore operators are
able to develop hydrocarbon resources more expeditiously and
inexpensively for the public's use, government regulators
are able to coordinate their efforts to better enforce the
laws of the land, and in the end, hydrocarbons are produced
under reliable environmental safeguards that are understand-
able to the general public.
The State of Texas does not have a perfect leasing and
regulatory program for its offshore oil and gas resources.
~rnong other problems there is very little baseline environ-
mental data being prepared or research going on as concerns
oil and gas in the coastal zone; the State is almost entire-
ly dependent on the Corps of Engineers for enforcement of
environmental stipulations in its waters; and minimum bid
requirements would still appear to be too low relative to
revenues received by offshore leasing programs in other
jurisdictions. The Texas program is, however, basically a
very good one and one from which other States and the
Federal government might learn a great deal.
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CHAPTER IV
THE FEDERAL PROGRAM
With passage of the Submerged Lands ~ct o~ 1953 and the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of the same year, the
Federal government established its authority over OCS
resources.ll From that time through 1984, 001 conducted
eighty-six lease sales for offshore oil and gas minerals.
In the course of those offerings, 333 million acres were put
up for lease; 21,073 bids were received for lana rights;
more than 38 million acres were lease0; and in excess of $51
billion was raised in bonus bid revenues for the Federal
treasurY.~1 The cumulative total for oil and gas condensate
production at the close of 1983 was more than 6.3 billion
barrels; for natural gas the total stood at over 62 billion
MCF (thousand cubic feet). Bonus bids, royalties, rentals,
shut-in payments, and other miscellaneous revenues brought
total collected revenues from the OCS oil and gas program to
over $68 billion as of 31 December 1983.l1
A more ominous facet of the OCS oil and gas program,
which has grown in importance during recent years as the
nation's need for OCS resources as increased, has been a
record of unmet eXgectations and growing frustration. This
study focuses on the political and legal problems that have
contributed to the program's poor record, rather than the
resource, technological, or economic limitations that to
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varying extents may also be involvei. Further discussion of
the problematic history of the program is included in the
Introduction to this study; the current status and processes
of the Federal government's OCS le~sing and regulatory
program are the sub4ect of this chapter.
Federal Jurisdiction
On S~ptember 28, 1945, President Truman issued Presi-
dential Proclamation Number 2667, unilaterally declaring
that " ... the Government of the United States regards the
natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the conti-
nental shelf beneath the high seas, but contiguous to the
coasts of the United States .•. subiect to its iurisdic-
tion and control."4/ The 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf later clarified the continental shelf
doctrine and established international definitions, but it
was the Truman Proclamation that first established U.S.
interest and jurisdiction over the submerged resources of
the shelf.~/
The historic Supreme Court decision in U.S. v. Cali-
fornia (332 U.S. 19 (1947)), and subsequent decisions in
u.S. v. Louisiana (339 U.S. 699 (1950)) and U.S. v. Texas
(339 U.S. 707 (1950))--the Submerged Lands cases--estab-
lished the paramount rights of the Federal government,
rather than the States, over the submerged lands of the
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contin~ntal shelf. The U.S. in 1945 brought the first legal
action to establish Federal rather than State control off-
shore; the suit against California charged that the State
had no authority to grant leases for oil and gas dev~lopment
beyond the limits of its inland waters. The Court found, as
concerned the three mile marginal sea off the U.S. coast,
that "National interests, national responsibilities, and
national concerns are involved. The problems of commerce,
national defense, relations with other powers, war and peace
focus there. National rights must therefore be paramount in
that area."!/ With the Supreme Court's decisions in the
Submerged Lands cas~s, the coastal States turned from the
legal process to political actions in their efforts to
establish dominion over the waters off their shores.
As early as 1937, Congressional legislation had been
sought to establish coastal State sovereignty over the
marginal seas. On May 22, 1953, when President Eisenhower
signed the Submerged Lands Act (Public Law 83-31), he
granted such powers to the coastal States. The title of the
act reads:
To confirm and ~stablish the titles of the
States to lands beneath navigable waters within
State boundaries and to the natural resources
within such lands and waters, to provide for the
use and control of said lands and resources, and to
confirm the jurisdiction and control of the United
States over the natural resource of the seabed of
the Continental Shelf seaward of State
boundaries.7!
The Act went beyond simply granting States title to
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submerged lands and settling the "Tidelands Controversy"
that had grown into a significant national issue~ it gave
statutory confirmation to the ;urisdiction and control of
the U.S. over the resources of the continental shelf subsoil
and seabed seaward of state boundaries, as asserted in the
1945 Truman Proclamation.~/
Subsequent to passage of the Submerged Lands Act, the
Supreme Court on two occasions has rendered decisions re-
garding States' offshore sovereignty. On March 15, 1954,
the Court uphel~ the constitutionality of the Submerged
Lands Act, ruling that Congress had the right to dispose of
lands belonging to the United States without limitation.
The State of Alabama originally brought the suit arguing
that (1) the submerged lands and natural resources held as
public lands were in trust for all States, and thus could
not be given to just a few, and (2) that the Act violated
the equal footing clause guaranteeing equal rights to all
States. The second argument was based on the facts that (1)
resources offshore some States were known to be much greater
than those off others and (2) that some States had boun-
daries of three marine leagues offshore while others only
had three miles. Thus the Act, it was argued, did not treat
States equally. Rhode Island brought a similar suit, which
the Court settled in the same decision. The Justices stated
in their rUling that under Article IV, Section 3, clause 2
of the U.S. Constitution, Congress could dispose of public
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lands at its own determination and that it was not up to the
Courts to judge how that trust was to be administered.~/
The second significant case regarding the Submerged
Lands Act was U.S. v. Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi,
Alabama, and Florida (363 u.s. 1, 121 (1960)). The U.S.
brought this suit originally against the State of Louisiana
in 1955 to establish the Federal government's iurisniction
over submerged lands and minerals from beyond the three mile
line out to the edge of the continental shelf. The U.S.
also sought an accounting of Louisiana's revenues from those
lands from June 5, 1950 forward (the June 5, 1950 date
marked the Supreme Court's ruling in the Louisiana and Texas
cases establishing Federal authority beyond States' inland
waters (as discussed previously)). The Court, after pre-
liminary proceedings, moved to include all the Gulf coast
States in the case, as it believed the interests of each
were involved.
The Court's decision, handed down on May 31, 1960, held
that Texas and Florida rightfully had claims to submerged
lands out to a three marine league boundary, based on the
territorial limits they claimed at the time of their admit-
tance into the Union.
The Court went on to establish the seaward boundaries of
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama at three miles and ruled
that the States were accountable to the Federal government
for revenues earned from lands beyond these established
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boundaries subsequent to the 1950 decision. The Justices in
coming to their decision held a variety of views, as evi-
denced by the six opinions written.lOI
The most recent action pertaining to the d~finition of
u.s. lurisdiction over submerged lands and minerals was the
March 10, 1983 Presidential Proclamation declaring a 200
nautical mile EEZ for the U.S. Within that zone, the Pre-
sident proclaimed that the U.S. had, inter alia, "
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting,
conserving, and managing natural resources, both living and
non-living, of the seabed and subsoil and the superiacent
waters. ."11/ The proclamation of a 200 mile EEZ is in
keeping with the articles of the Third United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea and would seem to be in line
with customary law regarding nations' offshore boundaries.
So at this time, U.s. jurisdiction over submerged lands
and minerals is established as extending from the seaward
boundaries of the coastal States to the edge of the 200
nautical mile EEZ (as measured from coastal baselines) or to
the outer edge of the continental shelf, whichever boundary
is furthest.
Leasing Authority
As a corollary to the Submerged Lands Act, Congress
passed in the same session the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
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Act of 1953 (CCSLA). The OCSLA gave the Federal government
authority to lease OCS lands for oil and gas development.
The Act granted broad authority and responsibilities to the
Secretary of Interior and focused primarily on the need to
develop OCS resources.12/
For twenty-five years the Submerged Lands Act and OCSLA
remained intact, unamended, as development on the OCS was
limited in scope, involved signi~icant levels of activity
only in the Gulf of Mexico and off Southern California, and
aroused little attention. The 1969 Union Oil blowout in the
Santa Barbara Channel off California and the 1973 OPEC oil
embargo led to radical changes in the static OCS program.
In the early 1970s, two vital national concerns--environ-
mental protection and energy independence--put national
priorities in turmoil and left the OCS development program
in a political limbo. The same dialectic also revealed
itself early on through significant conflicts in purposes
within the statutory and regulatory framework through which
increasing OCS leasing activity would proceed.!ll
In 1974, the U.S. Senate passed the first legislation to
amend the OCSLA; it was not until 1978, however, that both
houses of Congress enacted bills providing new guidelines
for OCS activity. Congress, through the OCSLA Amendments of
1978 (OCSLAA), attempted to balance competing national con-
cerns--concerns that continue to plague the program today.
Numerous Congressional committees were involved in the
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legislation's development, many on-site investigations and
hearings were held, other nations' offshore management
policies were reviewed, and the amendments were the subiect
of extensive floor debate.14/ The legislation developed out
of this activity had ten basic purposes:
1. Declare a national policy for OCS development.
2. Improve provisions for lease administration.
3. Require the submission by the lessee of an ex-
ploration plan, and a development and production
plan.
4. Revise the bidding system.
5. Provide coastal states with an increased role in
Federal OCS decisions.
6. Provide for an OCS information program.
7. Provide for safety standards and enforcement
mechanisms.
Establish an Offshore Oil Spill Pollution Fund.
Establish a Fisherman's Contingency Fund.
Amend the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 to
include a coastal energy impact prograrn.~1
While other laws and regulations are ap~licable to the
OCS leasing and regulatory program, the OCSLAA provides the
fundamental framework and guidelines through which the
Secretary of Interior governs offshore oil and gas activity
today. The rest of this chapter will outline how the
Minerals Management Service, within the Interior Department,
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currently carries out the Secretary's responsibilities under
the OCSLAA for implementing the OCS leasing system and off-
shore operating regulations.
Lease Schedule
Pursuant to Section 18 of the OCSLAA, the Interior
Department published in 1978 regulations establishing
procedures for the preparation, maintenance, and periodic
review of a five-year OCS oil and gas leasing program.~/
The preparation and approval process for a five-year plan
proceeds over a two-year period. Since enactment of the
1978 Amendments, there have been two five-year programs, a~d
a third is now in preparation for the period of late-1986
through late-1991. The tentative schenule for the program's
development is shown in Figure 4.
The Interior Department, in the past, has used the
five-year program development process as an opportunity to
restructure and make other lesser adjustments to its leasing
system. It was through the July 1982 five-year OCS leasing
schedule that the areawide leasing process and other stream-
lining procedures were introduced--the areawide process
sought to offer all unleased and unencumbered tracts in
every sale held in each planning area, rather than offering
only selected or nominated tracts.
The first step in the lease schedule preparation process
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NEW 5 - YEAR OCS PROGRAM TIMELINE
Schedule for Development ot Program
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6
f-J
o
lJl
Solicit Commenl, and COlluro !l--
Prepare and Preparo nnd elnnn I
Prepara and DI,tribule Comment Commenl Distribute N 01111-Dlstrlbule
Oralt Proposed Program Period Period Proposed en I'on
Proposed Program Final Program PlIl iod
E I S Schedule
Preliminary EIS Dala Galherlng ScophJ Prepare and Comment Co~lele Final
Coomen1a Dlslrlbule Ore It EIS Period EIS
Figu~e 4. Development Schedule fo~ five-yea~ OCS Oil and Gas
Leasing P~og~am fo~ late-1986 th~ough late-1991.
(U.S., Depa~tment of the Inte~io~, Mine~als Management
Se~vice, "State Consultation Unde~ the OCS Lands Act
Sections 18, 19, and 25," Decembe~ 1984.)
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is a public request for suggestions and information, as
published in the Federal Register. Letters to the coastal
State Governors and interested agencies are also sent.
Comments are called for regarding the geographical, geolo-
gical, and ecological characteristics of the broad areas
under consideration; other uses of the resources and space
of the CCS; identification of areas of environmental
sensitivity and marine productivity; the technological
feasibility of, time periods required for, and interest in
OCS exploration and development: and applicable portions of
the States' CZM programs to OCS oil and gas activitY.!2/
The comment period is open for forty-five days; in pre-
paration for the third fiv~-year program, over 60 comments
were received by MMS.~/
While at numerous stages throughout the OCS leasing and
regulatory process the MMS makes special requests for in-
formation and comments from States and the public, it is
important to remember that anyone may comment to MMS at any
time on the agency's activities. Though the Service speci-
fically requests information at required or convenient
points within the framework of its programs, it remains
responsible to the people and States at all times and must
always respond to comments about its program.
Following the receipt of comments and information from
its initial request, the MMS conducts analyses as required
by Section 18 of the OCSLAA and prepares a draft proposed
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program for review and approval by the Interior Secretary.
The draft proposal is submitted for comments to coastal
State Governors and a notice of availability of copies is
published in the Federal Reqister. The comment period is
open for sixty days, and all comments submitted within the
proper period by Governors must be responded to by the
Secretary in writing.
with comments on the draft proposal in hand, a proposed
program is prepared. When completed, it is sent to coastal
State Governors, Congress, and the U.S. Attorney General~ a
notice of public availability is also published in the
Federal Register. The proposed program has a ninety-day
comment period.
Concurrent with preparation of the five-year program, an
EIS for the schedule is readied. As part of public parti-
cipation in the EIS process, comments are called for and
public hearings are held. The draft EIS is published at the
same time as the proposed program.
Based on consideration of all comments received, the
analyses performed by MMS, and the ErS, the Secretary
defines the proposed final program. Once completed the
program is submitted to the President and Congress. The
submission must also include reasons why specific comments
of the Attorney General, or State and local governments,
were not accepted. Sixty days following Presidential and
Congressional notification, the Secretary may approve the
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program.19/
Lease Sales
For the purpose of leasing, in the June 1982 final five-
year OCS oil and gas leasing program, the waters off the
continental u.s. and Alaska were divided into twenty-four
planning areas and over the course of the five-year period,
forty standard sales were to be held. The Gulf of Mexico
OCS region was divided into three planning areas with annual
areawide sales to be held in the Central and Western Plan-
ning Areas and biennial sales scheduled for the Eastern
Gulf--a frontier area that has seen little OCS activity.
Each of the sales off the continental U.S. had a set
preparation schedule proceeding over a twenty-three month
period. For sales off Alaska pre-sale activities took an
additional three months, as more time was allowed for EIS
preparation and comments. The sale schedule, as published
in June 1982, has been altered throughout the five-year
period to a significant extent. For various reasons, the
majority of sales in the original schedule have been de-
layed; examples of causes include further consultation with
affected coastal States, litigation, reassessment of indus-
try interest, and necessary additions or alterations to
EISs. In addition to the delays, five scheduled sales have
been canceled. Changes to the five-year schedule are noted
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on the tentative milestones schedule for future sales pub-
lished periodically by MMS.
There are essentially ten major steps in the Federal OCS
pre-lease process; the normal schedule for these steps is
shown in Table 5. A flow diagram of the process is pre-
sented in Figure 5. The first step in the preparation of an
OCS lease sale is the identification of areas of hydrocarbon
potential in the given planning area. The identification is
based on data found in a sale specific geology report pre-
pared over a six-month period prior to the area identifica-
tion. The geology report includes the locations of areas of
hydrocarbon potential and a description of the environmental
geology on an areawide basis; it is a generalized, scien-
tific document.£Q1
At least two months following the identification of
areas of hydrocarbon potential, MMS publishes in the Federal
Register a call for information and notice of intent to pre-
pare an ErS. The call for information is the first formal
step in the pre-lease process as identified in 30 CFR 256,
23-25 subpart D. The call is issued for a very broad area,
usually several million acres. Over a 45-day comment
period, potential bidders are asked to identify their areas
of interest; while States and other concerned parties may
identify areas they believe should be excluded or only
leased under special conditions. Conflicts or concerns
related to affected States' CZM programs are also to be
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SiEPS IN OFFSHGRE LEASING
~o~th
LC~'~r 48 /,1as<a
IDESilFY AREA OF
HYDPOCA2BON POTENTIAL
CALL FOR INFORMATION
PUBLISH NOTICE OF INTENT
TO PREPARE AN EIS
AREA IDENTIFICATION 4 4
DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT 12 15
PUBLIC CO~~ENT PERIOD 14 17
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 18 21
STATE11ENT
PROPOSED NOTICE
OF SALE 19 22
GOVERNORS CO~IMENTS 21 24
FINAL NOTICE OF SALE 22 25
SALE 23 26
BID REVIEW 24 27
LEASE ISSUED 25 28
Table 5. Timing of Steps Leading to an OCS Lease Sale.
(U.S., Department of the Interior, Minerals Management
Service, "State Consultation Under the OCS Lan6s Act
Sections 18, 19, and 25," December 1984.)
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Preparatory Process for an Des Lease Sale.
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"State Consultation Under the Des Lands Act
18, 19, and 25," December 1984.)
Figure 5.
(U.S., Department
Service,
Sections
III
identified.
The notice of intent to pcepace an Ers initiates the
"scoping" pcocess and public assistance is invited in
identifying significant issues and altecnatives to be
considered in the ErS. Undec the National Enviconmental
Policy Act of 1969 (~EPA) (Public Law 91-190), EISs must be
pcepaced foe all OCS lease sales.
While the call foe infocmation occurs nearly two yeacs
pcioc to a sale and covecs millions of acces and many
thousands of tcacts, it is to industcy's benefit to cespond
as specifically as possible with its intecests in given
tcacts. If industcy does not make its intecests known at
this vecy early stage, but State oc othec pacties concecns
over specific tcacts are strong, MMS may decide to defec
those areas where concerns ace high fcom further consi-
deration foe leasing. This situation puts an onecous
cesponsibility on offshore operators to be well prepaced
with theic research and to have identified aceas whece they
are intecested in bidding more than two years prior to the
sale. This also cceates a situation whece small independent
operatocs often cannot afford the upfront investment neces-
sary to participate in the pcocess until some aceas have
already been deferred fcom the sale: thus the major oil
companies ace the "voices of industcy intecest" heacd in the
significant early stages of pre-lease activity.
Appcoximately fouc months aftec the call for information
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is published, the MMS issues the area identification for the
sale. The area identification announces the parts of the
planning area on which the EIS process will focus and that
will be considered for leasing. Areas are deleted from
further analysis at this point if significant multiple use
conflicts are apparent and the potential for hydrocarbon
discovery is low. The review leading to these early dele-
tions includes evaluation of the comments received from the
call, the past leasing history of the area, environmental
resources, multiple use conflicts, and resource estimates.
During this analysis period, MMS also consults with the Fish
and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice, as regards biological resources; the u.s. Coast Guard,
concerning navigational safety conflicts; and one of the six
committees set up by MMS to advise the Service on regional
issues and concerns--the Regional Technical Working Groups
(each OCS region has a Group except for the Atlantic region
which has three).
In addition, negotiations are conducted with the Depart-
ment of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, and areas of joint-use or exclusive-use are
defined offshore. In certain OCS regions, the military has
sought to severely restrict oil and gas development where it
might limit naval or other operations. Currently, explora-
tion work in nearly the entire Eastern Gulf of Mexico OCS
Planning Area has been restricted to allow for Navy aircraft
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coming year. In the 1980s, the size of each of these
publications has varied between 474 and 752 pages~ also
included are a dozen or more full color plates. With so
many of these documents produced, each covering the same
basic subject, the EISs vary little from draft to final copy
or from year to year.
There are a great number of problems with the EIS pro-
cess as structured by Congress and the courts; very few of
which have to do specifically with the OCS oil and gas
leasing program. The large resources the MMS invests in
publishing two of these documents each year to cover area-
wide sales in the Gulf of Mexico make clear the problem,
however. These huge documents assess the environment of a
vast region in general terms that are often repeated over
and over each year. It is questionable how much information
the documents provide to industry operators planning pro-
iects on specific tracts, State or local planners trying to
judge impacts in their localities, concerned citizens
anxious about projects off their coveted shoreline, or,
worst of all, Federal policy makers dealing with contro-
versial issues related to lease sales for whom they are
prepared.
Testimony before the House of Representatives Subcom-
mittee on Oceanography on April 2, 1985 by Donna Black,
representing the American Petroleum Institute, made clear
what little use EISs are to industry. Ms. Black, speaking
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for industry inter~sts in the Federal/State consistency
debate, argued that Federal OCS sales should not be required
to agree with State coastal zone management plans because
too little environmental information is available prior to
lease sales. Ms. Black stated that only after the industry
had studied certain tracts specifically could environmental
data be provided as to the effects of exploration or deve-
lopment on the planning area. While EISs are prepared for
government policy makers rather than offshore operators, if
the documents were effectively providing information on
specific environmental impacts to policy makers, that in-
formation should be available to others through the public
documents. The impact statements fulfill legal and bureau-
cratic requirements at a high cost; Ms. Black's statements
make clear that they are not of great use to industry and
that candor brings into question their utility to the
Federal policy makers they are prepared to serve.
Scheduled for issue approximately one month after pub-
lication of the final EIS, the proposed notice of sale
informs the public of areas that are proposed for sale,
procedures and methods of bidding, proposed lease stipula-
tions, and measures to mitigate potential adverse impacts.
Along with publication of the notice of sale in the Federal
Register, the Governors of affected States are sent copies.
The Governors have sixty days to comment on the size,
timing, or location of the sale. If specific comments are
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d~livered to the Secretary of the Interior within the com-
ment period and they represent a reasonable balance between
national and State interests, the comments are to be ac-
cepted. Rationales as to the Secretary's determination of
national versus State interests are to be forwarded to the
responding Governors in writing.
Thirty days before the sale is to be held, and after the
Governors' comments have been considered, the Secretary of
Interior issues a notice of sale. The notice is published
in the Federal Register and includes the date, timing, loca-
tion, blocks to be offered, terms, and conditions of the
sale.
On the day of the sale, the sealed bids submitted are
opened publicly and read. Following the sale, high bids on
tracts are assessed by the MMS Regional Office conducting
the sale to assure receipt of what MMS determines to be fair
market value. Within ninety days, bids are accepted or
rejected and leases are awarded. Leases on the OCS are let
in most cases for five-year primary terms. In certain
cases, leases have longer terms, but include additional
stipulations; examples are leases awarded for tracts in 400
to 900 meter water depths where the primary term is eight
years, or in depths greater than 900 meters, where leases
are awarded for ten years.
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Cost Structure
As set out in the OCSLAA, the Secretary of Interior is
authorized to grant to the highest responsible qualified
bidder or bidders, oil and gas leases for any unleased and
unencumbered OCS lands. Also set forth in the OCSLAA:
The bidding shall be by sealed bid and, at the
discretion of the Secretary, on the basis of--
(A) cash bonus bid with a royalty at not less
than 12 1/2 per centum fixed by the Secre-
tary in amount or value of the production
saved, removed, or sold;
(B) variable royalty bid based on a per centum
in amount or value of the production saved,
removed, or sold with either a fixed work
commitment based on dollar amount for ex-
ploration or a fixed cash bonus as deter-
mined by the Secretary, or both;
(C) cash bonus bid, or work commitment bid
based on a dollar amount for exploration
with a fixed cash bonus, and a diminishing
or sliding royalty based on such formulae
as the Secretary shall determine as equi-
table to encourage continued production
from the lease areas as resources diminish,
but not less than 12 1/2 per centum at the
beginning of the lease period in amount or
value of the production saved, removed, or
sold;
(D) cash bonus bid with a fixed share of the
net profits of no less than 30 per centum
to be derived from the production of oil
and gas from the lease area;
(E) fixed cash bonus with the net profit share
reserved as the bid variable;
(F) cash bonus bid with a royalty at no less
than 12 1/2 per centum fixed by the Secre-
tary in amount or value of the production
saved, removed, or sold and a fixed per
centum share of net profits of no less than
30 per centum to be derived from the pro-
duction of oil and gas from the lease area;
(G) work commitment bid based on a dollar
amount for exploration with a fixed cash
bonus and a fixed royalty in amount or
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value of the production saved, removed, or
sold; or
(H) subject to the requirements of paragraph
(4) of this subsection, any modification of
bidding systems authorized in subparagraphs
(A) through (G), or any other systems of
bid variables, terms, and conditions which
the Secretary determines to be useful to
accomplish the purposes and policies of
this Act, except that no such bidding sys-
tem or modification shall have more than
one bid variable.2l/
Paragraph (H) opens the bidding process to a wide
variety of possible systems; such new systems must, however,
be implemented in consultation with the Secretary of Energy
and submitted to Congress for thirty days review prior to
use. In the actual operation of the OCS leasing program, on
an experimental basis, a small number of leases have been
awarded with 12 1/2 or 33 1/3 percent royalty rates and some
others let under profit share payment plans or sliding scale
royalties, but the vast majority of leases have been awarded
using 16 2/3 percent fixed royalties with variable bonus
bids determining lease award.
In May 1983, the u.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)
published a report, at the request of the u.s. House of
Representatives' Government Operations Committee, on use of
alternative bidding systems as required under OCSLAA.
Approximately forty percent of the leases offered by MMS
between 1978 and 1983 utilized alternative bidding systems.
One percent of the leases awarded during this period had a
fixed royalty rate of 33 1/3 percent with bonus bid. The
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GAO found that among the ten alternatives tested, three
initially "had a clear edge over the traditional cash bonus
bid, fixed 16 2/3 percent royalty rate system in increasing
both company participation and competition in OCS lease
sales."~/ The use of a 33 1/3 percent fixed royalty rate
was one of the three alternatives found to have positive
results, with increased participation and competition, and
similar bonus bids received.
The GAO report went on to recommend that Congress amend
the OCSLAA "to provide for continued use of alternatives
• for another S-year period.23/ The GAO determined that
additional time and testing were needed to get a complete
picture of results from alternative systems, especially as
to how the varying alternatives impacted later exploration
and development on the OCS.
The Interior Department replied to the GAO report in
September 1983, objecting to many of the report's con-
clusions and recommendations. Questions raised by 001
included those related to differing definitions of alter-
native leasing systems, faulty methodology, conclusions
based on simple, short-term trends, and varying approaches
to determining effects on exploration and/or development
offshore. Specifically, 001 felt there was no need for
Congress to mandate the continued testing of alternative
bidding systems as the Department planned to consider
alternative systems for each sale in any case.24/
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Assessing the advantages and disadvantages of bonus bid
based leasing systems in economic terms, their virtues are
that (1) production is kept in alignment with socially
optimal levels, (2) the most efficient firms are selected,
and (3) the program is relatively easy to administer.
Problems include (1) if competition in bidding is not
effective (as has been argued by critics of the areawide
leasing system) the lessor may not capture full economic
rents and (2) risk-adverse bidders may lower their bid
levels to allow for a risk premium.~/
In considering how this emphasis on bonus bids has af-
fected the OCS leasing program to date, the most revealing
fact is that sixty-nine percent of lease revenues (other
than taxes) are bonus bid monies.~/ As Federal revenue
from the OCS program in any given year is so closely tied to
bonus bid revenues, pressures to raise revenues immediately
translate into pressures to lease more lands. One study
completed by DOl predicted that doubling royalty rates from
16 2/3 to 33 percent would reduce bonus bids by 25 per-
cent.~/ There are numerous arguments for and against
increasing royalty rates for oil and gas production. To
this date, however, the Interior Department has taken little
action towards significantly raising revenues through higher
royalties; rather, ever increasing amounts of OCS acreage
are offered to raise revenues through bonus bids.
Dependent on bonus bid monies, the program's revenue is
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also highly depenjent on the Gulf o~ Mexico OCS. In the
Gulf region, mainly offshore Louisiana, over 99 percent o~
natural gas production and 96 percent of all oil production
on the national OCS has occurred. Thus the Gulf of Mexico
region has accounted for 77 percent of bonus revenues, 97
percent of royalties, and 79 percent of all rents received
by the Federal government from all the OCS.~/
In addition to bonus bid and royalty revenues, the
Federal government charges annual r~ntal f~es for OCS lands
of $3 per acre; there are also fees from shut-in reserves,
minimum royalty payments and other minor miscellaneous
sources. The Federal government has no production or
severance taxes on OCS resources.
Revenue Distribution
During fiscal years 1971 through 1983, a total of
$57.315 billion has been distributed from OCS revenues. Of
this total, $49,808 billion has gone into the U.s. Trea-
sury's general funds; $6.683 billion has been deposited into
the Land and Water Conservation Fund, and $.824 billion has
gone into the Historic Preservation Fund. The Land and
Water Conservation Fund is used by the Federal government to
buy park and recreation land and to assist States in plan-
ning, acquiring, and developing land and water areas for
recreational US8. The Historic Preservation Fund provides
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matching grants to States (and through the States to local
governments), and to the N~tional Trust for Historic Pre-
servation for the study, identification, purchase, and
reconstruction of historic properties.~/
Section 8(g), the 1978 OCSLAA, provides the single
method for the direct sharing of OCS oil and gas revenues
with affected coastal States. Section 8(g) is applicable to
OCS blocks within three miles of States' seaward boundaries
that may contain one or more oil or gas pools or fields
underlying both OCS and State lands. The revenues from the
lease of such OCS lands are to be distributed in a "fair and
equitable" manner agreed to by the Secretary of Interior and
affected coastal State Governors. Between 1979 and 1985,
more than $5.5 billion was collected from 8(g) tracts and
held in escrow by DOl as no agreement could be reached as to
the revenue split.
The Interior Department has argued that Congress simply
meant to compensate States for the drainage of oil and gas
from their lands adjacent to the OCS. Federal District
Court rulings in 1984, however, sided with States' inter-
ests, in part, finding that 8(g) revenue distribution should
reflect the fact that Federal bonus receipts may have been
enhanced by information obtained through prior leasing of
adjacent State-owned areas. While the cases were appealed
by DOl, one judge in Texas ruled that the escrowed funds
should be split equally between the State and Federal
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governments.lQl
Between 1979 and 1985, the States became increasingly
concerned with the slow progress of 8(g) negotiations. In
1984, both Louisiana and Texas, long staunch supporters of
offshore development, filed suits to block OCS lease sales
off their coasts; their two major reasons for bringing the
legal actions were to (1) protest the slow resolution of
8(g) negotiations with 001, and (2) prevent 001 from leasing
8(g) lands under the areawide system, which States felt did
not guarantee fair return on the resource in which they were
to share. Combined with the District Court ruling, these
actions led to heightened tensions concerning the 8(g) fund
distribution issue late in 1984 and early in 1985.
The Secretary of Interior, in an effort to "•..
prevent further controversy and avoid future protracted
litigations.. "offered States 16.67 percent of bonus and
rental revenues in August 1984; this offer was rejected by
the States.31/ In June 1985, the Administration agreed to
terms for distribution included in a House of Repre-
sentatives Budget Conference Committee Resolution. The
escrowed funds under the proposal would be split 27/73
percent between State and Federal governments, respec-
tively. Estimates of the amounts States would receive under
the formula are:
o
o
Alabama
Alaska
$64 million
$56 million
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0 California $374 million
0 Florida $.03 million
0 Louisiana $492 million
0 Mississippi $15 million
0 Texas $377 million
This formula has become the standard for disbursements
of 8(g) monies. C~rtain lesser issues related to Section
8(g) remain unsolved, however, such as the split of Federal
tax revenues from 8(g) tracts. The States have argued they
are entitled to a share of tax revenues under the OCSLAA, as
the taxes are a part of OCS revenues from 8(g) tracts.
Post-lease Regulation
Once an offshore operator has been awarded the lease for
a given OCS tract, the most significant, and difficult,
requirement prior to initiating exploratory drilling is, in
most cases, gaining approval for a plan of exploration (POE)
from the appropriate MMS regional office (see Figures 6 and
7). Each exploration plan for a given lease includes (1)
the proposed type and sequence of exploration activities;
(2) a description of drilling vessels, platforms, and other
structures that could come into contact with the seabed,
including safety and pollution control devices; (3) the
types of geophysical equipment to be used; (4) the approxi-
mate location of each exploratory well; (5) a detailed oil
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spill contingency plan; (6) other relevant geological and
geophysical information; (7) an air-quality analysis; and
(8) any other data the Director of MMS may require.~/
In addition to the POE document, a plan, to be complete,
must include an environmental report and an explanation of
the plan's consistency with adjacent coastal States' CZM
programs. Environmental reports include (1) a description
of onshore support facilities to be utilized; (2) the number
of persons to be employed; (3) projected quantities and
compositions of solid, liquid, and gaseous wastes~ (4) sup-
port boat and aircraft transit patterns; (5) major supply,
service, energy, and water requirements for implementing the
project; (6) identification of environmentally sensitive
areas; and (7) an assessment of the effects of the explora-
tion work on the coastal and marine environments.ll/ Much
of the information contained in the environmental report is
used by affected coastal States' CZM staffs to assess con-
sistency with their management programs.
Industry operators may conduct preliminary geological,
geophysical, and other surveys of the OCS in order to gain
the information necessary to prepare their POE. Approval of
a relatively simple permit is required prior to initiating
survey work on the OCS. Critics of MMS have raised concerns
as to the ease of gaining survey permits and the Service's
lack of any enforcement mechanisms in regions where permit
stipulations are applicable. This has been an especially
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controversial issue in the Alaskan Arctic OCS where the
effects of sonic blasts used in seismic surveys are believed
to impact bowhead whales and other marine life.
Upon submission to MMS, the complicated POEs are re-
viewed for completeness and conformity with rules, regula-
tions, and MMS policy. Once a POE has been deemed complete,
MMS has thirty days to judge the document. Copies of the
complete POE, including the environmental report and CZM
consistency statement, are forwarded for review to other
interested Federal agencies, adjacent States' Governors, and
related State agencies. Copies are also made available to
the public, with any proprietary data deleted.
As MMS initiates its consideration of the POE, engineers
and other technical personnel prepare comments: the POE is
also reviewed to assess environmental impacts. In the
well-developed regions of the Gulf of Mexico OCS, it has
been determined that exploration projects do not create
impacts that are individually or cumulatively significant as
defined under NEPA. In these mature OCS areas, a categori-
cal exclusion review (CER) is conducted for each POE; if it
is determined that no significant impacts are expected, no
further environmental study is required under NEPA. Where
significant impacts are possible, or there has been little
previous oil and gas activity, MMS conducts and documents
its own environmental assessment (EA) as stipulated in
NEPA. If through the EA the Director of MMS concludes that
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there will be no significant impact on the quality ot the
marine, coastal, or human environments, a formal "finding of
no significant impact" is prepared~ if significant impacts
are seen as a possibility, the MMS prepares an ElS. The
Service, in recent times however, has never prepared an EIS
as part of the approval process for a POE in well developed
areas of the Gulf of Mexico region.l!/ While, at present,
CER exemptions are only used in the Gulf of Mexico OCS
region, if other OCS regions are developed to a similar
point in the future, where exploration projects are found to
have no individual or cumulative impacts on the environment,
CERs would be utilized in those areas also.
Following MMS review of the POE and analysis of comments
from other agencies, the Service approves, disapproves, or
recommends modifications to the plan. If approved, MMS may
still not permit offshore activity on the project until
State CZM concurrence is received from each affected State.
State CZM agencies have three months to concur with, object
to, or notify MMS that more time for analysis is required.
If more time is requested, a three-month extension is
granted~ if the State CZM program takes no action within the
first three months, consistency concurrence is assumed.
Following its review, if a State CZM program denies con-
sistency to a POE, an appeal may be made to the Secretary of
Commercej this but is a long and highly political process
with only a limited chance for success.
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Offshore operators are also required to have an approved
Application for Permit to Drill (APO) prior to commencement
of operations. The APO is submitted to MMS either with or
subsequent to submission of the POE. The APD specifies in
detail the drilling program to be followed, including
descriptions of the blowout prevention system, the casing,
cementing, and drilling-mud programs, and the results of the
site specific shallow hazards survey. The MMS technical
staff reviews the APO in detail; later the document will
serve as the basis for inspections of the operator's opera-
tions. Additional APOs must be filed and approved each time
a well is deepened, reworked, redrilled, or plugged back;
sundry notices are also required for operations conducted
that are not directly related to drilling, such as fracture
treatment, perforating, or acidizing.121
In 1976, the Secretary of the Army was given authority
to prevent Obstructions to navigation on the OCS, extending
the jurisdiction of the River and Harbor Act of 1899.~/
Thus, prior to initiation exploratory work on the OCS, per-
mits are also required from the Army Corps of Engineers.12/
In addition, other permits are required for aids to navi-
gation from the u.s. Coast Guard, and under the National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System from the EPA. These
permits are, in most cases, routinely approved in less time
than is required to review POEs.
131
Environmental Studies Program
In addition to the environmental work the MMS pursues
through EISs, the Service also conducts the Environmental
Studies Program (ESP). The ESP is the largest, single-
agency, mission-oriented oceanographic program in the
Federal government.38! Between 1973, the first year of the
program, and 1984, MMS spent approximately $370 million on
ESP (see Figure 8). Program expenditures increased ten-fold
in 1975 and doubled again in 1976, as a result of the deci-
sion to lease off Alaska where little oceanographic data was
available to policy makers.~/
Since 1973, nearly one-half of ESP funds have gone to
Alaska, the remainder have been divided between the Atlan-
tic, Gulf of Mexico, and Pacific regional offices, and the
headquarters in Washington, D.C. that funds national
studies. The overall goal of the program is to provide DOl
with the necessary scientific information to assess the
environ~ental impacts of proposed offshore development, to
delineate sensitive coastal and marine zones, and to iden-
tify environmental hazards in order to ensure that the
Department has the data necessary to fulfill its respon-
sibilities under NEPA and OCSLAA.
Research under ESP is conducted by universities, State
and Federal agencies, private firms, and research insti-
tutes. Except in Alaska, ESP is managed by MMS with input
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from the Regional Technical Working Groups and the OCS
Advisory Board Scientific Committee. Tn some cases, members
of these advisory boards may make significant, useful con-
tributions to the ESP planning process; in other instances
"management by committee" problems arise and little sub-
stantive advice is provided to MMS. Studies are ranked to
receive funding priority by (1) the importance of the
research to decision makers; (2) the date of the decision
for which the study results are to be used; (3) the generic
applicability of results from the study; (4) the availabi-
lity and completeness of existing information; and (5) the
applicability of the information to issues of regional or
programmatic concern.!Q/
The Studies Program in Alaska, owing to a lack of tech-
nical expertise or experience in the region on DOT's part
when the ESP was initiated, was contracted out to be managed
by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's OCS
Environmental Assessment Program. As MMS has increased its
own experience with ESP and in Alaska it has taken over more
of the program's management responsibilities in the state
and its role will, in all likelihood, continue to grow.
Studies funded through ESP may be divided into seven
general categories, though studies often do not fit into one
or another category neatly: (1) biological studies; (2)
hazards studies; (3) effects studies; (4) socioeconomic
studies; (5) containment distribution baseline studies; (6)
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transport mechanisms; and (7) ecosystem processes. While
ESP has produced a tremendous amount of scientific data on
this Nation's OCS, there remain important concerns as to the
program's management and utilization of the data produced.
The question of management centers on the issue of
whether the agency that is mandated and has the regulatory
responsibility to develop the oil and gas resources of the
OCS, which by definition involves impacting the environment,
should then also manage the program monitoring those im-
pacts. The analogy to the fox guarding the henhouse, and
then also being employed to keep an accounting of the
chickens and eggs inside, if not entirely fair, is a good
one.
The second area of concern related to the ESP involves
the utilization of the data produced in the leasing or regu-
latory policy making processes. In the past, prior to
development of the first EIS for leasing in a new planning
area, an ESP synthesis meeting was held to (1) assess
scientific data from the region; (2) identify data gaps; and
(3) attempt to apply the knowledge to leasing questions;
smaller meetings were also held prior to the second and
third sales in given areas. As the majority of active
planning areas have already passed through this synthesis
process, the MMS has introduced annual information transfer
meetings (ITM) in each of the four OCS regions to dissemi-
nate ESP results. Held over a two or three day period,
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these ITMs not only allow for the reporting of ESP contrac-
tors' findings, they seek to be a forum for wide-ranging
discussion of regional scientific inquiry and debate.
While the ITMs are clearly a positive step, questions
remain as to how well ESP data are assimilated into the body
of scientific knowledge or into DOl decision making pro-
cesses. Many ESP studies are never published or reviewed by
the scientific community; while MMS has recently tried to
index the information available, much of the data is lost to
the world once the contract is completed. From earlier
discussions in this chapter concerning problems with the
utilization of EISs, it may be concluded that including ESP
data in the ElS process is, at present, a questionable way
of ensuring its integration into the decision making pro-
cess. At nearly every decision point in the OCS leasing and
development process, specific predictive scientific infor-
mation regarding the environmental outcomes of management
alternatives under consideration would have tremendous
value.!!/ Currently, however, there appear to be only
indirect routes for the application of ESP knowledge to
leasing or regulatory decisions; thus the nature of the
results themselves or the researchers trying to disseminate
the data are often the determining factors in its use.
The potential of ESP is tremendous, and the program
speaks well for the Federal government and DOl in particular
when compared to State leasing programs where no scientific
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ostudy is funded: but the problems are real. In 1978 the
National Research Council of the National Academy of Sci-
ences published a critical report on ESP and many problems
were corrected. In September 1986, the MMS commissioned a
second review of the Environmental Studies Program to be
conducted by the National Academy of Sciences.~/ This
multi-year, independent review of the ESP should guide the
MMS towards increasing the utility of its scientific program
in the future.
Summary
The Federal government exercises jurisdiction over the
submerged lands and subseabed minerals seaward of State
boundaries to the edge of the continental shelf, or out two
hundred nautical miles from the coastal baseline, whichever
is furthest. Within this territory, the Minerals Management
Service of the Department of Interior is charged under the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 with:
o making offshore oil and gas resources available to
meet the Nation's energy needs as rapidly as pos-
sible;
balancing orderly energy resource development with
protection of the human, marine, and coastal en-
o
vironments;
ensuring the public a fair and equitable return on
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othe resources of the OC8; and
preserving and maintaining free enterprise compe-
tition.
The MMS, operating under close scrutiny from environ-
mentalists and pro-development interests, pursues their
goals with mixed success. Many of the problems and frus-
trations have been more the result of political rather than
technological limitations, however; factors that MMS has
only limited control over. This chapter has set out the
long, arduous, and complicated leasing and regulatory pro-
cess for the OCS as simply as possible and highlighted some
problem areas. Other controversial facets of the program
have just been touched on, such as criticisms of the area-
wide leasing system as opposed to tract selection offerings
of lands.
The schedules and processes for conducting OCS lease
sales are set out in five-year oil and gas leasing programs
developed by DOI. Five-year programs govern the when,
where, and how of lease sales and are produced through a
two-year preparation process. Over these two years, three
drafts are completed, an environmental impact statement is
finalized, concurrence from other Federal and State
agencies, coastal State Governors, Congress, and the
President is sought, and the program is the subject of
wide-ranging public comment. The schedule that is produced
at the end of this two-year process, however, is likely to
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be the sUbject o~ significant and regular changes, costly
court battles, and public acrimony from both development and
conservation interests.
Individual lease sales proceed through a similar deve-
lopment process with a series of proposals defining areas to
be leased, production of an ErS, review by other Federal and
State agencies, Governors, and the public. The results, for
sales proposed in frontier leasing areas, are most often the
same also: delays, court cases, and public acrimony. The
approval process for the permits necessary to initiate ex-
ploration drilling is also often the subject of controversy
in frontier areas. A complete plan of exploration is a
thorough and often complicated document and while MMS review
is limited to thirty days, adjacent States' coastal zone
management programs may review the document for up to six
months, then deny consistency and send the plan into a
lengthy appeals process.
The MMS, in addition to many EIS projects, conducts the
largest, single-agency oceanographic program in the Federal
government--the Environmental Studies Program. This program
has been responsible for gathering a great deal of scienti-
fic data on the oes since its inception in 1973. Questions
exist, however, concerning the MMS' role in directing ESP,
as the agency acts as both impactor and assessor of the oes
environment. Other concerns have been raised as to the role
of MMS as a scientific organization, the assimilation of ESP
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data into the body of working scientific knowledge, and the
use of ESP results in Dor leasing and regulatory policy
making processes.
There are a good number of valid criticisms of the
program MMS has developed to manage OCS resources--among
others, nearly seventy percent of revenues are derived from
bonus bids putting great pressure on MMS to lease large
numbers of blocks; the EIS process provides little infor-
mation useful to industry, the public, or government
decision makers; it is incumbent upon offshore operators to
become actively involved in the leasing process, with a good
deal of expensive information already researched, years
prior to any lease offering and with little assurance that
specific tracts in the end will be leased or then cleared
for exploratory drilling.
On the other hand, the OCS development program has
offered more than 333 million acres of submerged lands for
lease in a wide variety of areas on the continental shelf,
more than 6.3 billion barrels of oil and 62 billion MCF of
gas have been produced ~rom the OCS, over $68 billion in
revenues to the Federal government have been earned, a
tremendous amount of scientific data has been gathered, and
since 1969, the regulatory system has permitted operations
that have proven safe and gone on without serious incident.
It must also be considered whether the OCS program, caught
in the nexus of interests balancing policy between environ-
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mental protection and ra~idly developing domestic energy
resources, could ever be conducted without turmoil.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
This study has set out to assess the offshore oil and
gas leasing and regulatory systems of Alabama, Texas, and
the Federal government and then, through that assessment,
identify facets of the States' programs that might, if
implemented by the Federal government, better effect the
goals of the OCS Lands Act Amendments of 1978. There has
been little criticism of the Alabama and Texas systems in
the course of this project, as the purpose has been to
identify the positive aspects of their programs. On the
other hand, numerous flaws within the Federal program have
been made clear. In this analysis and comparison process,
means, through the positive aspects of the State programs,
have been drawn to needs, as pointed out through problems in
the Federal program.
The Federal OCS oil and gas leasing and regulatory
system has been and continues to be the subject of much
study, controversy, and debate. In recent years the most
pressing areas of concern have been the use of areawide
versus tract selection lease offering systems; the sharing
of oes revenues with coastal States; the right of States to
make pre-lease consistency determinations; the "fair and
equitable" sharing of revenues from Section 8(g) tracts, the
restrictions placed on offshore development in certain oes
146
regions by Congress, the Department of Defense, and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration: and the
concentration of leasing and exploratory work in limited
areas of the OCS, among others. This study has attempted to
step outside the debate that has surrounded these issues and
instead focus on the fundamental problems in the structure
and practice of OCS leasing and regulation. The broad and
general nature of any study considering such fundamental
issues has been made more manageable by looking at the basic
issues through comparisons to the Alabama and Texas pro-
grams. This final chapter of the study sets forth a number
of findings, areas identified for further consideration, and
recommendations for action.
The goals of the Federal OCS management program, as set
out in the OCSLAA, provide a logical framework and a clear
set of purposes against which the results of the program can
be tested. Congress, in expressing its interests, gave 001
dir2ction that the Alabama ann Texas programs lack. Without
clear legislative guidelines, the State programs work under
assumed goals that are very similar to the Federal ones, if
not so clearly stated. It can be concluded that all the
offshore management programs in the U.S. have the same
general responsibilities. They work to preserve, protect,
and develop oil and gas resources in a manner consistent
with the need to (1) make resources available to meet needs
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as rapidly as possible; (2) balance orderly offshore deve-
lopment with protection of the environment; (3) ensure
returns from the pUblic resources developed; and (4)
preserve and maintain free market competition.
Certain limited exemptions to the pursuit or guarantee
of these goals, or to the manner in which they are
"balanced" by government policy makers must be allowed in
jUdging various programs, but overall a consensus could be
drawn that each program attempts to effect these goals. A
good example of an exception would be the 1982 offering of
submerged lands off Alabama, following the very successful
1981 State lease sale that brought in nearly a half billion
dollars in bonus bids. The 1982 sale was pushed through the
preparation process in only sixty days as political pressure
to raise additional "windfall" revenues was high. The
results of the 1982 sale were disappointing as the few bids
received were extremely low and only one was accepted.
Given that the goals set out are ones to which almost
all can agree, the question becomes how to best implement
them. This is difficult as each of the goals is important
and each, to a great extent, may also be mutually exclusive
to another. The most apparent dialectic contained within
the OCSLAA and the nation as a whole is between the
necessity of protecting the environment and the need to
maximize development of domestic energy resources.
The costs of continuing conflict over the OCS management
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program are tremendous and growing. None of the OCSLAA
goals are being served well through the turmoil that has
embroiled the program since the early 1970s. Considered in
a more positive light the costs could be interpreted as the
potential value of planning and developing a less conten-
tious system. The study by the OCS Revenue Sharing Working
Group of the President's Cabinet Council on National
Resources and Environment that estimated the costs to the
nation of delays in leasing, deletions of tracts from
offerings, legal expenses, and other forms of opposition to
the OCS program at over $1 billion per year was probably
conservative. The study did not take into account many very
real costs, such as the effects of "discounts" industry
would logically subtract from bids on controversial acreage
where opposition to development was expected, the costs of
deletions made prior to the proposed notice of lease sale
stage, the costs of implementing various stipulations or
studies, or various other possible but inestimable costs.
It would be impossible to derive a real number to reflect
the true losses to the nation of conflicts over the OCS as
so many varying and interrelated costs are involved. The
costs are as real as the conflicts, however, and what is
most tragic is that such a great portion of the costs are
not related to technological or economic limitations, but to
political ones that in the end produce little but waste.
Three central issues are to be focused upon in consi-
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dering alternatives to current Federal OCS management
practices and the conclusions from comparisons drawn in the
text. The first considers environmental regulation, the
second return on rights and resources, and the third dis-
tribution of exploration and development rights. Each
alternative put forth must be analyzed and tested on the
basis of its utility in lessening conflicts in the leasing
and regulatory process and better effecting the goals of the
OCSLAA.
Environmental RegUlation
The Environmental Studies Program, environmental impact
statements, and consultations with affected coastal States
and interested parties are the most significant means by
which 001 currently seeks to gather and assess data on the
environmental effects of OCS development. Concerns that
these means and the regulations developed from them do not
ensure protection of the environment, a goal of the OCSLAA,
are justified. The ESP is good in and of itself, and that
is just about as far as it often goes. There are only
indirect means for assimilating ESP research results into
the OCS policy decision making process and little data is
reviewed in professional journals or enters the working
"body of scientific knowledge." The EIS process produces
huge, standardized, and generalized documents that are
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expensive, but of little use to offshore operators, the
public, or even the decision makers they are prepared for
prior to each sale. Consultations between State and Federal
officials most often take place in a political and con-
frontational situation, rather than as meetings between
scientists, planners, and other mid-level, knowledgeable
professionals. The goals of each side entering negotiations
to resolve the concerns are often opposed and the results
poorly serve the public.
The environmental coding system as employed by the State
of Texas in its coastal waters has proven to be an effective
tool for gathering and disseminating environmental data.
There are few significant costs associated with the coding
of offshore tractsi the codes, rather than being a major new
program on their own, are a framework through which informa-
tion and concerns can be organized and made useful. In such
a framework much of the information about the OCS already
collected could be made more accessible to offshore opera-
tors, the public, and Federal, State, and local officials.
Drawn up by representatives from interested Federal, State,
and possibly even local agencies, the OCS codes would
indicate specific concerns of knowledgeable professionals as
regards sensitive environments on a tract by tract basis.
While the influence of politics could not be ignored, the
task of developing detailed coding recommendations would
appear to hold little allure to those outside the marine or
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coastal zone management fields. Serving as recommendations
only, decisions on using individual codes as federal lease
stipulations could be later made by higher level policy
makers--though it would be assumed that the advice of
scientists and other "experts" would be fUlly considered.
The codes, develope~ by these specialists, might serve as a
useful foil to opposition as higher level decision makers,
facing political pressures, try to implement costly re-
strictions in sensitive areas.
The use of environmental codes would benefit those on
each side of continuing OCS development debates. For off-
shore operators, the codes would provide an easy source of
information on specific OCS tracts and associated problems
before any investment was made in surveying a tract. The
operator would also know up front what all parties' concerns
were, what likely stipulations would require, and who was
voicing what concerns. This would alleviate much of the
risk offshore operators now undertake in bidding on OCS
tracts and lessen the "discounting" that currently takes
place as operators assume those risks.
For DOl, the co~ing system would provide a readily ac-
cessible framework for ESP results and provide guidance as
to where further studies were required. The system would
also serve as a basis for the Ers process; detailed, up-to-
date knowledge of the concerns of all parties' parts would
allow for better analysis of potential impacts on the larger
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planning area basis described in EISs. The codes, by
providing information as to which agency put which concerns
forth, would facilitate negotiations of mitigating measures
or specific operating procedures between the parties imme-
diately interested. Areas of concern and responsibility
between agencies would be clarified, as each would know
exactly what the others were doing. As mentioned earlier,
the codes, as drawn up by the "experts", could also serve as
a foil for decision makers placing controversial environ-
mental restrictions on sensitive tracts.
For State and local officials, the codes would allow a
means of making their environmental concerns heard outside
heated, political forums. While not addressing all of the
coastal States' concerns regarding OCS development, espe-
cially revenue-related questions, the coding system as it
was reviewed and updated would allow for effective and
regular State input into the OCS management process.
For the public, the coding system would provide an
accessible means of judging how specific environmental
concerns were being handled; the EIS process addresses this
need to some extent, but is often too generalized or too
imposing a volume to be of great use to the average citi-
zen. Indirect benefits to the public would be realized
through higher revenues, as "discounting" for risks was
lessened; more effective use of the environmental studies
funded by the government; and less waste in the OCS manage-
153
rnent process.
The value of the coding system is limited, however. It
is simply a means for gathering and disseminating
information. It cannot, on its own, lessen the substantive
disputes that have led on many occasions to the courts or
decrease the impacts of oil and gas activities on sensitive
environments. Its value is in ensuring that all parties
have ready access to the same information, but from that
point the onus is again on the parties involved to negotiate
the best possible solutions to very real conflicts.
The oes is a vast area and original development of codes
for each tract would be an arduous and time-consuming task.
All tracts need not be coded at once, however, and there are
many persons involved in oes research and management on a
regional basis, so that the work could proceed in pieces.
Once codes have been developed for a region, the process of
regularly reviewing and updating the recommendations should
be a more manageable task. There are a great many areas of
the oes where little detailed data is available; this fact
should not be an argument against the use of the tract
specific coding system, however, but rather a reason for
further study and survey of the oes and its resources.
While the work involved in developing meaningful codes for
each tract on the oes would be great, so too could be the
reward in terms of greater knowledge and better management.
The experiences gained by Texas in implementing and using
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its system could also prove to be an invaluable asset.
From the review of Alabama's offshore environmental
regulatory system, the general conclusion might be drawn
that industry can operate competitively under environmental
stipulations far more stringent than those imposed currently
throughout much of the OCS.
The State of Alabama allows no discharges of any kind
into its coastal waters by offshore operators. A study by
Exxon of the costs related to this restriction during the
drilling of three exploratory wells revealed additional
expenses ranging from 13.7 to 22.1 percent of total w~ll
costs. The increasing levels of oil and gas activity in
Alabama waters make clear that operators believe they can
produce gas profitably even with these added costs and
royalty rates as high as twenty-eight percent along with
eight percent severance and production taxes. It is pro-
bable that given more experience with work under the zero
discharge clause and the wider availability of drilling
platforms and rigs equipped to catch all wastes, costs
associated with the restrictions could be lowered, but
additional manpower would still be needed and the associated
costs would remain substantial.
These added costs must be weighed against the envi-
ronmental benefits and the value of less conflict and
opposition to work offshore as environmentalists' and
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States' concerns were allayed. This is not to argue that
all work on the OCS be carried out with no discharges
whatsoever, for obviously environmental effects two hundred
miles offshore would be much different than those in the
shallow Mobile Bay. However, empirical evidence from
Alabama does suggest that offshore operators can work
competitively under much more stringent environmental
restrictions than are currently applicable throughout most
of the OCS. Depending on the restrictions it may be a net
benefit for the operator to work under stricter regulations
if opposition to their activity, as a result, is reduced.
In many cases, in nearly every OCS region, the MMS has
already implemented specific restrictions which have effec-
tively protected certain ecosystems and lessened opposition
to offshore oil and gas activity; there are, however, a good
deal more opportunities for such specific actions.
The utility of the environmental coding system in im-
plementing stricter regulations on the OCS is clear. with
the knowledge available through the codes as to tract
specific concerns and recommended compensating operating
procedures, stricter environmental regulations could be
employed with maximum utility. Through the code system the
efforts made by industry to better protect the marine and
coastal environs would be more obvious to State and local
officials, and citizens concerned about the risks of off-
shore development.
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Return on Rights and Resources
Approximately seventy percent of Federal revenues from
the OCS are currently derived from bonus bids; in part this
is due to the fact that the royalty rate on nearly all OCS
leases is 16.67 percent. The Federal government also levies
no additional severance or production taxes, as is the case
in Alabama and Texas waters. However, the OCS, in addition
to being a very important domestic energy supply, is a major
source of income for the Federal treasury--second only to
taxes.
Given the importance of income from the OCS and the fact
that Federal budget deficits have been, and will continue to
be in the near term an overriding policy concern for Con-
gress and the President, pressures to keep OCS revenues
stable and high cannot help but be strong. With the largest
portion of those revenues derived from bonus bids, pressures
to keep income from the OCS stable and high translate imme-
diately into pressure to lease large numbers of tracts each
year. While numerous other factors shape OCS leasing policy
too, it would be difficult to argue that these revenue con-
siderations were not part of the reasoning behind the Reagan
Administration's decision to try and open the entire OCS to
areawide leasing. The areawide leasing program, though
limited by ongoing opposition in various coastal regions of
the nation, has resulted in relatively high and stable OCS
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revenues since its introduction.
There has been a great deal of criticism of the areawide
leasing program, much of it centering on the argument that
limited public resources are being given away for less than
fair market value. Looking at national budget realities,
however, domestic social welfare programs; national planning
and research programs, such as coastal zone management; and
other very valuable Federal programs are being cut to reduce
deficit spending. In this situation, it might be argued
that leasing vast areas of the OCS, which results in high
current revenues but the sale of resources for less than
their maximum value, might not be a bad policy decision
relative to other efforts to cut deficits. The questions
presented here are much more complicated than just set
out--deficit reduction is not a simple choice between aid to
mothers with dependent children or areawide leasing, opening
vast areas of the OCS to exploration has benefits in and of
itself, and a myriad of other related arguments can be en-
tered into the political debate. But simply stated, as long
as OCS revenues are so directly related to rates of offshore
leasing, budget induced pressures will exist to keep leasing
rates high.
The State of Texas has royalty rates generally set at 25
percent with severance taxes of 7.5 percent on gas and 4.6
percent on oil. Since discovery of the Mary Ann gas field,
the State of Alabama has let leases with royalty rates
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generally set at 25 percent, but ranging up to 28 percent.
Alabama also has set severance and production taxes totaling
8 percent for offshore leases. Royalty rates for OCS oil
and gas production on future leases could be substantially
increased and still be less than or equal to the effective
royalties collected by States, such as Texas and Alabama, in
their coastal waters.
An increase in royalty rates would lead to a decrease in
the portion of OCS revenues derived from bonus bids. Budget
induced pressures to lease large numbers of tracts each year
would decrease as income from the OCS came to be founded
more on stable returns from higher royalty rates, and the
percentage of revenues dependent on bonus bids decreased.
Thus leasing policy decisions could be based more on re-
source and environmental considerations than budgetary
questions. This shift in emphasis would not necessarily be
immediately perceptible, as higher leasing rates will always
yield higher immediate returns while any bonus bids are
collected. With seventy percent of current OCS revenues
based on bonuses, however, shifts in leasing rates cause
direct and radical shifts in income. While higher royalty
rates would not directly bring lower leasing rates, a
lessening of the wide swings in income due to leasing rate
variations would allow policy makers greater freedom in
adjusting those rates.
The second significant consideration in raising royalty
159
rates would be the possibility of increasing the return on
resources developed. An Interior Department study predicted
that doubling the OCS royalty rate would result in a twenty-
five percent decrease in average bonus bids. It is logical
that raising royalty rates would result in some decrease in
bonus bids offered for tracts, but empirical evidence from
Alabama and Texas leasing results does not support such a
direct correlation. The two States have royalty rates, and
production and severance taxes that total nearly twice the
amount earned from OCS production, yet the average bonus
bids received by Alabama are much higher than those on the
OCS, while the average bonus in Texas is much lower. Thus,
while it cannot be denied that higher royalties would in
some cases lead to lower bonuses, royalty rates would not
appear to be the critical factor in determining bonus bid
levels in many cases.
Higher royalty rates might also lead to fewer conflicts
in the OCS management program as the implied budgetary
pressure to lease large numbers of tracts was eased. As
the importance of leasing the greatest possible acreage
decreased, other factors in policy decisions, such as en-
vironmental impacts or competition, could be considered in a
more balanced fashion. The receipt of greater revenues from
the OCS resources could lead to decreased opposition to
further development in the long run.
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A second conclusion related to return on rights and
resources that might be drawn from comparisons of the
Alabama, Texas, and ~ederal offshore oil and gas programs
regards the effect of competition on bonus bid returns.
Again, a most complicated matrix of factors determines bonus
bids and no one result can be tied to only one factor;
variations in geology must be highlighted as a reason for
bid differentials. The evidence, however, does suggest
areas for further consideration.
In its August 1984 offering oE State submerged lands,
Alabama's average bonus bid totaled $3,470 per acre. Texas
held two offshore sales during 1984, and the average bonus
bid received for both totaled $240 per acre, a bonus return
nearly twice that received in previous years. The Federal
government held one sale in the Central Gulf of Mexico off
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama in 1984 and received an
average bonus bid of $581 per acre. In a 1984 sale in the
Western Gulf Planning Area off Texas, the bonus received
averaged $433 per acre.
In comparing the States' results in bonus bidding and
the level of competition for leases in those States, rela-
tionships are found. Alabama has only 133 submerged tracts
within its jurisdiction. Discoveries in Mobile Bay have led
to estimates of significant reserves of natural gas in the
area and interest in offshore development has been high.
The State has kept its offerings small, rejected many bids
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as insufficient, and effectively kept competition tor leases
very strong. The State, as evidenced by the 1984 sa12
results, has also received relatively high bonus bids for
leases.
Texas offshore waters are also known to hold significant
gas reserves, but development in those waters has gone on
for years. The energy industry and State have a long and
close relationship. For years the State practice was to
offer all unleased and unencumbered offshore tracts in which
industry voiced any interest; the State also accepted every
high bid received for tracts. Thus competition for tracts
was low and many were leased time and time again over the
years. In 1983, after a review of State leasing results in
comparison with bonuses received on adjacent Federal OCS
tracts, some measures to increase bonuses were implemented.
In the October 1983 lease sale, twenty-two high bids were
rejected as insufficient and, for 1984 sales, minimum bid
requirements and nomination fees were im90se0. These ac-
tions, at least in part, resulted in the doubling of average
bonuses received, but the measures were limited. As a rule,
all tracts nominated are still offered for sale and minimum
·bid levels are not extremely high, so competition has re-
mained low and, as evidenced in 1984 sale results, average
bonus bids have remained relatively small. This simple
comparison of competition levels and average bonus bids
between Alabama and Texas would seem to suggest a rela-
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tionship; an argument could be made that the same sort of
relationship between competition and bonus bid rates would
also exist on the OCS.
Distribution of Exploration and Development Rights
The current Federal system for scheduling and conducting
OCS lease sales is a t~emendously long and uncertain pro-
cess. An offshore operator could ex?ress interest in a
given offshore region early in the five-year program
development process, when such input from industry is
requested, have that advice accepted by DOl, and not find
tracts in that specified area offered for up to seven years,
even with no opposition or unscheduled delays. While 001
only has limited control over the delays or deletions of
tracts caused by opposition to offshore development, the
Department has a great deal of control over the scheduling
and conduct of sales. The length of time currently built
into the system between an operator's expression of interest
and the actual offering of leases is extremely long, at the
very least nearly two years. This situation forces industry
to make decisions as to leasing interests, an expensive
research process, years before the investment can possibly
payoff through a discovery. The up-front investment re-
quired often shuts independent oil and gas companies out of
the selection process as the costs of expensive OCS research
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at least two years prior to leasing has proven prohibitive.
To an extent the areawide leasing system has overcome
much of this problem as the goal of the leasing system is to
offer all available OCS lands in a region in each sale.
With areawide leasing independent operators have begun to
bid on OCS tracts, especially in the Gulf of Mexico region.
But continuing opposition to offshore development has led to
deletions of significant numbers of tracts in various re-
gions. In this situation, even with "areawide" leasing, it
is incumbent upon operators to make their specific interests
known to DOl so that deletions of tracts in high interest
areas are avoided where possible.
In Texas the lease sale process is almost constantly in
motion. Tracts are offered every six months and there is
little history of litigation in State waters delaying
sales. Thus, at most, if an operator nominated a tract for
sale the day after consideration of tracts for offering in
the next sale was closed, the wait until the nominated tract
was offered would not be more than ten months. At least,
the wait would be four months and the regular schedule is
well known so that operators can easily pace their research
investments for maximum return. Under the Texas system, an
operator is also almost certain to have nominated tracts put
up for sale in the next available offering.
In Alabama, there is no schedule for lease sales owing
to the fact that there are only 133 submerged State tracts.
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With heightened interest in offshore lands in the Mobile Bay
area, however, the State has held a number of sales in re-
cent years. Under the lease sale preparation schedule used
for the August 1984 sale, which State officiaJ.s have decided
to use as the basic framework for future lease sale prepara-
tions, tract nominations were accepted up until four and a
half months prior to the offering.
The Federal leasing system must meet a number of regu-
latory requirements, such as completion of an EIS, from
which the State systems are exempt. There is no reason,
however, why these regulations require industry to make its
specific interests known at least two years prior to an oes
offering.
Allowing industry to submit nominations or voice its
interests in specific regions at points in time closer to
sale dates would allow operators to participate in the lease
sale preparation process without requiring unduly long
periods of capital investment prior to any chance of
return. This would create a situation where more small,
independent operators could afford to participate in the
sale preparation process. And while not necessarily true,
this might also encourage hiqher levels of competition for
oes resources and increased development of domestic oil and
gas resources offshore as more operators began to partici-
pate in the process. So through adjustments in the sale
preparation process, that could in themselves save the
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fying such work could be based simply on the value of MMS'
increased ability to judge the value of the rights and
resources it was releasing.
As considerations such as those presented in this study
are pursued, an ever increasing number of concerns and
questions are raised. At some point a line must be drawn,
however, and discussion concluded, for on difficult policy
issues such as these the questions will not be simply
answered nor concerns easily allayed.
Recommendations
On the basis of the comparative analysis pursued between
the offshore resource management programs of Alabama, Texas,
and the Federal government, the following recommendations
are made:
(1) The Federal government should implement a resource
management recommendation code system similar to
that utilized in Texas, as a framework for the
assessment of the oes environment.
(2) Further consideration should be given to stricter
environmental protection stipulations on oes
operations, as a means of minimizing environmental
impacts.
(3) Royalty rates for oes production should be raised
to a level comparative to levies on production in
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Alabama and Texas waters, allowing for increased
returns on public resources and less pressure to
maintain high leasing rates.
(4) Consideration should be given to increasing com-
petition for OCS leases in order to better assure
high rates of return for public resources.
(5) The OCS lease sale preparation process should be
adjusted to allow for industry input as to specific
areas of interest at a point closer to the actual
sale date, allowing more operators to participate
in the process.
Each of these recommendations would also serve, in
different ways, to lessen the conflicts and turmoil that
currently embroil the OCS leasing and regulatory program.
The benefits of a less confrontational program go beyond
those gained simply through the conduct of a more rational
and efficient resource management process; they touch each
of the goals set forth in the OCSLAA.
Lessened conflicts and turmoil would naturally reduce
the risks taken by industry, encourage more operators to
work offshore, and allow for more effective environmental
protection. The results would be safer operations offshore
with less environmental impacts and a less fearful public;
increased competition and higher levels of development as
more operators ventured offshore; and higher revenues for
the Federal government as bids were discounted less for
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risks, more information was made available to operators in
making their leasing decisions, and activity offshore
increased.
There are many ste?s that could be taken to lessen the
turmoil surrounding OCS development and each, individually,
would benefit the nation. The recommendations made in this
study are certainly not the only, or necessarily the best,
actions that could be taken; they are simply a basis for
further consideration and discussion. The resources of the
OCS are of vital national interest and the political con-
frontations that currently mark each step in the development
process are tragic wastes when effective, proven alterna-
tives are available that might serve the interests of all.
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1\ I; t~ 0 U N C E J.j E I' T
CflLL FOR NOt·lI r~I\T IONS
SUlJnCf1GED LANDS
STATE OF ALAn~~~
The St:lte of Al.-Ib"ma, DcpLlrtr,lcnt of Conscrv,ltion Llnd
N"turi11 [(CSOUl"ces h.-Is len.3tivcly :;ct AU\j\lst 1'1, 1984, .3S the
d~te for its next major oil and gas lease sale pertaining to
state-owned submerged lands in Alabama's coast~l waters.
The purpose of this announccment is to solicit \o.'ritten
nominations by numbered tracts in accordal,1ce ....·ith the
enclosed map entitled "State of Alabama, Oil and Gas Lease
iracts, Coastal Area Submerged Lands~.
The enclosed official tract nomination form must be
used in making all nominations. The completed form and
check in the non-refundable amount nf $25.00 for each tract
nominated should be mailed to the Department of Conservation
and Natural Resources on or before March 30, 1984.
For additional information, contact the state Lands
Division, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources,
64 North Union Street, Montgomery, Alabama 36130, telephone
number (205) 832-6354.
TE~~ATIVE SCHEDULE
September I, 1983
March 30', 1984
April 3.0, 1984
May 17, 1984
May 31, 1984
June 8, 1984
June 15, 1984
August 14, 1984
September I, 1983
Issue Call for Nominations
Deadline for Nominations
Preliminary Tract Selection
Public Hearing
Deadline for Comments
Final Tract Selection
Legal Notice of Lease Sale
Lease Sale Date
~l~ U/--/../v-~John W. Hodnett, Commis~10nerDepartment of Conservat~on
and Natural Resources
APPENDIX 1. Call for Nominations and Tenative Schedule,
Alabama State Offering of Submerged Lands 14 August 1984.
(Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, Call
for Nominations.)
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APPENDIX 2.
(Texas,
Bids,"
PurSGant to :.-~a;J~er 32 a:",.~ S.J"~::;-.Ci;:~e:-! /.._:., G & E of Cl':a~~er 52 of the
.'\a~:..:~a..! F.e~·::..:;",,=e~ Cc:!~, a:::: s~:je:~ t.c all r..;~e3 a"~ re:~:a~ic~s prot!lu~ga~e<!
by the Cor:::iss10ner of the :er.eral Land effice a~e/or t~e School Lane Soare
pursc;ant thereto, a~d all other applicable 3tat'~les ar.d a".endrtenls to said
Natural Re~:J"r=e5 C<xle. provieing for the lea31"g of certair. areas belonging
to the State, the Sch:>ol Land 50arc of tr.e Stote of Texas will receive
co:::~.. t1tiye sea:: .. e bies until 10:00 A.M., April 2, 1ge5, at the General Land
Office in Austin, 'exas, and ~i11 lease such areas tc the highest bidder
(subJect to the r:ght to reject any ane all bies; for t:-.e ;:roeuction Of oil
and/or gas.
All bids s:-.all be sealed and add.-essed to the CO~I':SSIO~;~R 0;:- TriE GENERAL
LAN;) Qi'i'ICE. STE?,,;:?; L. AUSTIN SUED:NG . .l1.Q.Q. NOR.ri CON:;?~ AY::/IUE , AUSTIN,
EXP.S :wJ.Ql,. The envelope shall be endorsed, "SEAL:.D E~D FOR MINEAAL LEASE,
APRIL 2, '985". Bles received not later than 10:00 A.H., APRIL 2, 1985, will
be opened at the first meeting of the School Land Bcard subsequent to 10:00
A.M., APRIL 2, 1ge5, such meeting to be held in the Genpral Land Office,
Austin, 'exas. Bids received after the above specified tir.e will not receive
consideration by the Board. ~~~ 2! bi~~·ng. ~ des~r'RtlQn~
in 1he. attached llit~~ fo'lo~ed,
Separate bUs must be filed for each area identified by a separate Pogl.
No., and the cash offered must accoc:pany each bid in some form payable at par
(Time Drafts not acceptable) to the Co::c:issioner of the General Land Offlce in
Austin, Texas. Section 52.019 of the Natural Resource~ Code provides that if
the highest bid for the same area is made by more than one applicant, all such
applications shall be rejected. .
Some of the tracts listed herein for oil and gas leases are situated
within one thousand feet of production of 011 and/or gas on privale1y owned
land. Section 52.03~ of the Natu:-al Re~o"JJ"Ces Code provides:
"(a) If oil or ga~ is produced in commercial quantities froc a well
located on a privately owned area and the well is located within
1,000 feet Of an area leased under this subchapter [Subcha~ter B of
Chapter 52 of the Natural Resources Code], the le~see of the state
area sr~l begin in good falth and prosecute diligently the drilling
Of an offset well or wells on the area leased from the state Within
60 days after the initial production of privately o~~ed area-
(b) An offset well shall be drilled to a depth and the means shall be
employed which may be necessary to prevent undue drainage Of oil or
gas from beneath tlle state area.
(c) Within 30 days aner an offset well has been completed or abandoned,
a log of each well :shall be filed in the land Office."
For additional information or bid forms, write to the Commissioner of the
General Land Office, Stephen F. Austin Building, 1700 North Congress Avenue,
Austin, Texas 78701.
NOTE: PURSUANT TO SECTION 32.110 OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES CODE, EACH
BIDDER ON A MINERAL LEASE SHALL REMIT BY SEPARATE CHECK AN AMOUNT
EQUAL TO ONE AND ONE-HALF PERCENT OF EACH BID, PAYABLE TO THE
COMHISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE, A.S A. SPECIAL SALE FEE.
THE SPECIAL SALE FEE ON HIGH BIDS ACCEPTED BY THE BOARD WILL BE
DEPOSITED BY THE COMMISSIONER Of THE GENERAL LAND OFfICE IN THE
STATE TREASURY. ALL SPEClAL FEES REHlrr-cn BY UI~UCCESSFUL BIDDERS
WILL BE RETURNED TO TIiCSE BIDDERS WITIi rnEIR BID CHECKS. ~
REMIT SEPARATE~ WITH~ .!lffi.
By order Of the School Land Board in regular meeting of said Board,
January 15, 1985.
Terms of a Texas Lease Offering of State Lands.
General Land Office, "oil and Gas Notice for
(Austin, January 1985),(Typewritten)).
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APPENDIX 3. Texas State Resou~ce Management Codes (I) Defin-
itions and Explanations, (2) Codes Assigned to Gulf of
Mexico Subme~ged State T~acts, and (3) Key to Agencies
Assigning Specific Codes to T~acts.
(Texas, Gene~al Land Office, ·Oil and Gas Notice for Bids,·
(Austin, Janua~y 1985),(Typew~itten».
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